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Some goods are only valuable, and some investments only profitable, in the 
presence of certain institutions.  The empirical literature on institutions and economic 
growth claims that institutions are a primary determinant of growth.  I find four 
mechanisms through which institutions may affect growth in Africa: property rights, 
contract enforcement, security and corruption.  This dissertation consists of three 
papers that empirically analyze the importance of these mechanisms while addressing 
the major empirical issues of endogeneity, measurement and level of analysis.  
The first paper uses Afrobarometer surveys to measure distinct regional 
institutions: fear of crime, law enforcement, trust and corruption.  I combine these 
variables with household data from 151 regions in thirteen African countries.  I avoid 
endogeneity by regressing household wealth on aggregate institutional variables, and I 
find that reducing the fear of crime increases wealth and improving the legal system 
increases wealth when fear of crime or trust in the national government is high.  
Corruption in different levels of government has positive and negative effects.  The 
results suggest that variation in institutions within countries is important. 
  The second paper (with Christine Moser) explores institutions within 
Madagascar at a low administrative level.  We use a unique commune census to 
analyze the impact of institutions and infrastructure on development of the 
manufacturing sector in Madagascar.  We find that not only do institutions matter, 
they play a causal role in both employment in manufacturing and in infrastructure.  
The data is a spatially explicit panel countrywide census with reasonable instruments 
for institutions.  We account for bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, 
  
and omission of neighboring commune characteristics.  Our results suggest that 
property rights institutions are fundamentally important for economic development in 
Madagascar. 
The third paper analyzes democracy in Africa.  Africa has become steadily 
more democratic since the end of the cold war, and I identify three mechanisms 
through which democracy may be instrumentally good.  Democratization is associated 
with better institutions, which lead to economic growth.  Democracies are more 
accountable and thus may have better health outcomes, and democratic countries have 
open political systems that may obviate civil conflict.  I estimate the effects of 
democratization with instrumental variables (IV) and simultaneous equations models.  
I find no significant effects of democracy in the IV models when country and time 
fixed effects are included.  The simultaneous equations results, which also control for 
country and time fixed effects, indicate that democracy may have strong effects on 
economic growth and significant but weak effects on the death rate in African 
countries.   
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1. Introduction 
 Some goods are only valuable, and some investments only profitable, in the 
presence of certain public goods and/or institutions.  These include public goods 
ranging from roads and electricity to institutions such as property rights and contract 
enforcement mechanisms.  Such institutions are typically not accounted for in a 
neoclassical framework, but they make up the key underpinnings of markets.  Their 
fundamental importance is sometimes overlooked in developed countries where they 
are readily provided, but in the developing nations of the world it is critical that 
researchers and practitioners alike take into account the role of institutions and public 
goods in development.  Without them, market based reforms are unlikely to work, and 
a ―big push‖ of aid can similarly be expected to fail. 
Several concepts here need to be clearly defined.  The definition of a public 
good – one that is nonexcludable and nonrival (and sometimes indivisible) - is 
standard (Cornes and Sandler 1986, Kimenyi 2006).  I will further differentiate 
between pure public goods, which are fully nonexcluudable and nonrival, and club 
goods, which are excludable (Cornes and Sandler 1986).  The definition of institutions 
is somewhat less clear.  The new institutional economics school vaguely defines 
institutions as ―rules for interaction‖ (North 1990).  I interpret this definition as the 
written or unwritten guidelines that guide people’s expectations of behavior.  
Institutions can be formal, such as explicit contracts, laws, etc., but they also can be 
informal rules such as table manners and social etiquette.  Institutions underlie 
neoclassical economics, but they are typically assumed to function perfectly.  
Microeconomic theory posits an implicit set of institutions.  First of all, 
property rights must be defined and enforced (i.e. there is little or no theft, and 
individuals know what is tradable).  Second, the neoclassical framework assumes 
relative equality and complete security – there is no coercion involved.  Third, there 
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must be enforceable contracts, particularly for intertemporal trade and for managing 
risk.   
A set of institutions can be seen as a public good, typically provided by a 
government.  For example, good governments provide security; they protect people’s 
bodies and property.  They have clear laws that define what is and is not property, 
what rights people have, etc., and they provide courts to enforce these laws and 
contracts.  I therefore define good governance as the steady provision of a set of 
institutions.  My focus here is on institutions and growth, so institutions are considered 
to be good insofar as they allow for economic growth.  The question of which 
institutions best encourage economic growth will be considered in detail in further 
chapters, but the basic answer is those institutions that are assumed to function 
perfectly in a neoclassical economic model: stable property rights, effective and 
anonymous contract enforcement, security and lack of corruption.   
Institutions are often taken for granted in economics.  This is probably because 
rich countries typically enjoy a stable set of homogenous institutions governing 
economic transactions, so there simply is not much variation in institutions in 
developed countries. In developing countries, however, institutions are far less 
homogenous.  Security is often an important issue, property rights are often not well 
defined, contract enforcement mechanisms may be weak and corruption may be 
rampant.   
It is clear that as rich countries have developed, institutions have become more 
stable and homogenous, but it is not clear which way the causality runs.  Does 
improvement in institutions allow growth or does economic growth lead to better 
institutions? (Paldam and Gundlach, 2008).  It seems likely that causality runs both 
ways.  The natural question then is what does the evidence say?  At this point, the 
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evidence on institutions is far from conclusive, and this dissertation will seek to add to 
it in several different ways. 
This introduction will develop a framework for thinking about institutions and 
growth, review the current literature on institutions and economic development and 
lay the foundation for the subsequent three chapters, each of which will add to the 
empirical literature on institutions.  I will focus on sub-Saharan Africa.  The countries 
in this area have similar enough histories and levels of development to make talking 
about them together sensible (Gordon and Gordon 2001).  This area of the world also 
lags behind everywhere else in terms of economic development and especially growth, 
so research that gives insight into these processes in Africa is certainly needed.   
The next section will outline a theoretical framework for thinking about 
institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Section three then reviews the cross-country 
empirical literature and section four the micro and meso empirical literature.  Section 
five introduces the subsequent three chapters.   
2. Theoretical Framework 
 Rather than attempting to posit one unifying theoretical framework, I will try 
to paint a broad picture by reviewing several relevant models that touch on aspects of 
public goods and institutions in Africa.  The first model is the standard public good 
model, including both pure public goods and club goods.  The standard result then 
follows that government intervention to provide the pure public good from tax 
revenues is the efficient outcome.  In the case of the club good, it can be provided 
privately or publicly in efficient quantities; in either case the key factor is the criterion 
for exclusion.  A market-based criterion will lead to efficient outcomes, while 
exclusion based on some other criteria, such as ethnicity or membership in a patronage 
network can lead to inefficient outcomes.   
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 The question now is: to what extent is the allocation of public goods in sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries efficient?  To answer this, and to justify theoretically 
our focus on SSA, I turn for a moment to a political theory of state formation (Herbst 
2000).  The basic idea presented in Herbst (2000) and echoed in later works by 
Robinson and Parsons (2006) and others is that the countries we see in Africa today 
are fundamentally different entities than those that evolved in Europe or anywhere else 
in the world.  Herbst argues that Africa in pre-colonial times was land abundant, so 
there were few wars over territory and poorly developed land rights.  People, by 
contrast, were the relatively scarce commodity and therefore property rights over 
people were much more developed (however abhorrent we may find them today).   
This basic situation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Africa is contrasted 
with Europe, where competition over the scarce resource – land – led to the 
development of strong, consolidated states with clearly defined territories.  The 
important point is that strong states arose out of a situation of fierce competition for 
territory (Herbst 2000).   
 When the European powers colonized Africa, they found some powerful 
kingdoms and tribes, but few well defined borders (Abernethy 2000).  They therefore 
created borders, in a fashion that paid little or no heed to the ethnic/tribal groups living 
there.  These borders were retained at independence, and have changed very little 
since then (Gordon and Gordon 2001).  Thus the countries we see in Africa today 
were created not through a competitive process that rewarded strong, centralized 
governments, but rather through arbitrary line drawing on a map by the European 
powers (Abernethy 2000).  The result is that many African countries do not and cannot 
effectively assert authority throughout their territory (Herbst 2000).  They also tend to 
be divided into many distinct ethnic groups, rather than forged along ethnic lines as in 
Europe.  Herbst’s argument suggests that were some countries to become predatory, 
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Africa would experience some wars over territory and would in turn develop stronger 
states.  However, in the postcolonial period the international community has 
recognized and given aid to the existing countries while foisting strong norms of 
sovereignty throughout the world (Barkin 1998).  Thus any African state that 
attempted outright predation would be ostracized and perhaps even stopped by outside 
forces.  The international system  strongly supports the status quo states in terms of 
territory (Barkin 1998).  International norms of sovereignty and non-aggression 
explain the small number of interstate wars in postcolonial Africa.  
 Therefore, largely as a result of outside forces, African countries today 
typically are characterized by weak governments, in the sense that they cannot assert 
authority throughout their territory and often experience crises of legitimacy (Herbst 
2000).  Since they face no territorial threats and the countries are divided along ethnic 
lines, African governments tend to build their support from one region or ethnic group.  
When they ascend to power, they then need only to reward their supporters and hold 
on to power internally.  Without external threats, one simple way to do so is through 
systems of patronage that reward supporters.  A typical African country in this 
framework will have one group that comes to power and then focuses all of the 
resources of government on rewarding their supporters and maintaining power (Herbst 
2000).  This type of ―neo-patrimonialist‖ government is contrasted with the modern 
―legal/rational‖ states we see in the developed world (Robinson and Parsons 2006).  A 
neo-patrimonialist state generally maximizes the surplus it can extract from non-
supporters to give to supporters and also rent-seeks international aid.  It is accountable 
only to supporters, who have little incentive to increase overall efficiency.  Out of 
power groups may have such incentives, but they tend to either be successfully 
dominated or to manage a coup d’etat only to act the same way themselves. This 
theory thus provides an explanation for the large number of civil wars in Africa.  In 
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contrast, in a legal/rational state, one government successfully asserts its power over 
its entire territory and thus provides a set of homogenous institutions to its 
constituents.  Legal/rational states are thus characterized by strong centralized 
governments, homogenous institutions and stability, while neo-patrimonialist states 
are characterized by weak governments, heterogeneous institutions, and instability 
(Herbst 2000, Robinson and Parsons 2006).  
We have now outlined a broad theory of the problems of African states.  Two 
points need to be made before we move on.  First, there are exceptions to the theory.  
Robinson and Parsons (2006) suggest Botswana as the notable exception.  Other 
countries fit to varying degrees, but I argue that the theory applies generally enough to 
SSA to be useful, and Robinson and Parsons (2006) echo the sentiment that this theory 
is widely accepted among political scientists.  The second point is that this particular 
theory applies uniquely to Africa and does not broadly fit other areas of the 
developing world.  Only Africa has the unique combination of postcolonial states with 
arbitrarily fixed borders ruled by indigenous people.  Latin America does not have the 
same degree of arbitrary borders, nor has power there ever been handed back to 
indigenous people.  Asia, with its higher population density had more effective states 
before the colonial period, and parts of Asia also had territorial wars at independence 
and in the postcolonial period, further consolidating state power (Abernethy 2000). 
Now that we have brought to mind the standard public goods problem and also 
laid out a political theory of states in Africa, it is time to combine the two to generate 
some hypotheses.  Our political theory suggests that African governments are likely to 
be dominated by one ethnic group that probably sits atop a patronage network.  
Kimenyi (2006) argues that throughout Africa this type of situation leads to two public 
good outcomes.  The first is that pure public goods will be underprovided by the 
government because they benefit all groups and the government maintains power more 
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effectively by channeling resources to its own group.  The second outcome is that club 
goods will be provided to members of the group in power, but not to members of other 
groups.  Indeed, club goods may actually be overprovided to members of the group in 
power (Kimenyi 2006).  The criterion for group membership is usually ethnic identity, 
which strictly limits entry and exit of groups.  Thus the public goods outcomes 
predicted here are quite inefficient.   
 Our framework thus far suggests that one group in power will transfer 
resources back to members of that group while ignoring and/or repressing other 
groups.  The next question is what happens to those people who are mostly ignored by 
the government.  These people can expect very little in the way of public good 
provision, and also very little in the way of police protection, contract enforcement 
and property rights.  Economic theory in general does little to model outcomes under 
such ―lawlessness.‖  Dixit (2004), however, in his book Lawlessness and Economics, 
does model several possible outcomes where the government is not present.  His 
models formalize some of the observations of Fafchamps (2004), such as 
producers/traders bringing goods to port and sleeping with them because that is the 
best way to insure against robbery.  Dixit’s models also capture some aspects of the 
work of Platteau (2000), who argues that social norms are very important in 
developing countries.   
 We will not fully present Dixit’s models here, rather I will summarize the 
intuitions and results of several of them that seem relevant and again generate some 
hypotheses.  The basic idea behind all of these models is the prisoner’s dilemma.  
People stand to gain from cooperation in trade, in provision of public goods, and in 
security, but without either trust or enforcement the incentives to cheat are too high for 
cooperation to occur.   
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The first model captures this intuition in a simple framework dubbed ―relation 
versus rule based governance.‖ (Dixit 2004) This is a game where a continuum of 
players are positioned on a circle.  When any two players interact they play a 
prisoner’s dilemma game.  There are two mechanisms that allow for cooperation.  The 
first is social sanctioning, which is effective in small groups.  This is modeled as each 
player having a neighborhood around them of people they trust and will cooperate 
with, while outside of this neighborhood they will not cooperate.  The intuition is that 
reputation mechanisms can insure cooperation in small groups, villages for example, 
where interactions will be repeated, if not with the exact same player then with 
someone else who knows everyone’s reputations.  The second mechanism is a system 
for anonymous monitoring, similar in intuition to the credit rating system in the U.S.  
Here any player can pay a cost to learn the type of any other player.  This system 
allows for efficient outcomes in large groups, but is generally too costly to implement 
in small populations.  Thus there are several equilibria possible.  For small 
populations, the reputation mechanism is efficient, and for large populations, the credit 
system is efficient.  An interesting result is that as one moves from a small population 
to a large population there is an intermediate range where neither system is efficient.  
This model thus suggests that in the absence of government provision of contract 
enforcement we should expect reputation mechanisms to be very important, but it is an 
open question whether formal or informal mechanisms are most efficient (Dixit 2004).   
 A second set of related models considers private provision of public goods.  In 
these two models we see private provision of information services and enforcement 
services.  The first models information services.  Here we again have players playing a 
prisoner’s dilemma, but now someone (aptly dubbed ―Info‖) collects information on 
other players and sells it for a fee.  In the second model we again have prisoner’s 
dilemmas, but here someone (dubbed ―Enfo‖) can be paid to inflict punishment.  The 
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results of both of these models are that private provision can improve efficiency to 
some degree, but there are also risks that Info and Enfo will attempt extortion or be 
dishonest themselves (Dixit 2004).   
 Finally Dixit models a society where individuals have three choices: they can 
be producers, protectors or bandits.  If a government exists that provides protection, 
there are no bandits in equilibrium.  If a government is not present then an equilibrium 
has an equal number of all three occupations, which is clearly inefficient.  However, 
he also considers the possibility here that the government itself is predatory.  Then it is 
necessary to distinguish between roving bandits and stationary bandits.  Roving 
bandits take whatever they can and move on; all that can be done is attempt protection.  
Stationary bandits, on the other hand, stay in one place and therefore do have incentive 
to invest in productivity.  Thus the equilibrium with a stationary bandit is more 
efficient, if still far short of the optimum situation of good governance (Dixit 2004).   
 These models give us some intuition of what to expect in situations where 
formal/federal government is absent or is predatory.  In some cases we will see that 
they do reflect what is observed empirically.  In other cases we don’t have good 
empirical evidence, so these models offer a starting point for further analysis.   
 One last theoretical note is to briefly review the analysis of corruption.  Our 
political model posits a nepotistic government, so corruption is likely to be present and 
potentially problematic in many African countries.  Bardhan (1997) reviews the 
literature on corruption and emphasizes the following theoretical results:  Corruption 
can theoretically decrease efficiency by imposing transactions costs and poorly 
allocating resources, but it can also theoretically increase efficiency in cases where 
bribes allow one to bypass red tape or distortionary policies.  The net effect of 
corruption is therefore an empirical question, and one that is currently in dispute.  The 
World Bank has sought to root out corruption in lending countries and Easterly (2006) 
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argues that governments in developing countries are so corrupt that aid given to them 
will be wasted.  Sachs (2005), on the other hand, claims that governments in Africa 
are reasonably good given their level of development and that corruption is not a big 
problem.  Based on our expectation of weak, nepotistic governments, we should 
expect that corruption in African countries decreases efficiency in most cases.   
 This theoretical discussion has sought to bring together aspects of political and 
economic theory and introduced several models to provide a framework for the 
subsequent arguments.  The key point from this discussion is that I expect to see large 
variation in institutions both across and within African countries.  The across country 
differences will arise from the different sizes and ethnic divisions of these countries.  
The within country differences will arise from the general failure of African 
governments to effectively assert power throughout their territory.  This variation is in 
contrast to developed countries, which are characterized by a much more homogenous 
set of institutions within and even between countries.   
The purpose of this dissertation is to further our understanding of how 
variation in institutions, both across and within countries in Africa, affects economic 
growth in Africa.  There are four primary institutions that may be important for 
growth: property rights, contract enforcement, security and corruption.  All four can 
lead to inefficiencies and all four may be problematic in African countries.   
The best system of property rights (I claim, without proof) is a homogenous set 
of property rights for every good that people want to trade in an economy.  These 
rights need to be upheld by well-enforced laws.  Homogeneity allows for maximum 
trade among the largest group of people, which can lead to optimal economic growth.  
However, my framework for Africa suggests that such homogeneity is highly unlikely.  
Consider land titling: my framework posits countries where the power of the 
government does not extend everywhere inside the borders.  It is therefore likely that 
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areas without a strong government presence will have their own systems of land 
rights, while more centralized areas may have formal legal deeds to land as is 
commonplace in developed countries.  The lack of a homogenous system, coupled 
with potentially higher volatility in traditional systems, can then hinder economic 
activity with regards to land, thus preventing investment and inhibiting growth.
1
   
Contract enforcement is necessary for an economy to develop because 
contracts enable trade over time, provide stability to workers and employers and 
reduce the risk of many transactions.  An efficient outcome is a system of perfectly 
enforced anonymous contracts, and again I expect most countries in Africa to be far 
short of this optimum.  Court systems based on the principle of anonymity are an 
anathema to patronage systems of government, whose operating principle is that those 
in the network are treated differently than everyone else.  Consequently, I expect large 
inefficiencies from poor contract enforcement, which may inhibit growth.  
Security is a public good that is generally taken for granted in developed 
countries.  However, basic insecurity, meaning a high risk of robbery and/or murder, 
can lead to costly adjustments by economic actors.  If robbery is expected if one is 
alone on the road to market, people will only travel in large groups and by daylight, 
thus limiting their options and increasing the cost of getting goods to market.  More 
broadly, if insurgent groups form to take on the government, the resulting civil conflict 
can grind economic activity to a halt.  I discussed previously how the interstate 
borders in postcolonial Africa have been remarkably stable, but the arbitrary nature of 
those borders has resulted in unstable governments and civil conflict in many cases.  
Security is therefore an important institution to consider in Africa.   
                                                 
1
 See Pande and Udry (2005) for an example of a traditional system of land rights that 
caused economic inefficiency.   
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The framework I presented suggests that African countries are likely to be run 
as patronage systems, which are inherently corrupt.  Such systems clearly lead to 
inefficiency by rewarding connections in the system over merit.  It is therefore likely 
that corruption may be highly problematic for economic growth in Africa.  It is also 
possible, however, that some corruption at lower levels can actually increase 
efficiency by allowing people to bypass red-tape.  The net effect of corruption is 
therefore an empirical question, and an important one.   
This dissertation will empirically analyze the role of institutions in economic 
growth in Africa.  The theoretical framework identifies four key institutional 
mechanisms to focus on: property rights, contract enforcement, security and 
corruption.  It further provides a broad political and historical explanation for why 
these institutions may be heterogeneous within and across African countries.  The next 
step is to review the current empirical literature and identify the key empirical issues 
that arise when analyzing institutions and growth.  
3.  Cross-country empirical results 
 Cross-country studies on institutions have been widely discussed in recent 
years (Pande and Udry 2005).  The basic idea of these studies is to carry out cross-
sectional regressions on GDP with some measure of institutions as an independent 
variable.  However, institutions are clearly endogenous to GDP, so the literature has 
focused on finding plausible instruments for institutions.  Perhaps the best known 
papers on these lines are Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (hereafter AJR, 2001) and 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).   AJR find that settler mortality rates from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are actually a plausible instrument for modern day 
institutions.  Using this instrument they subsequently find that property rights 
institutions are positively and significantly correlated with GDP (AJR 2001).  
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) further consider contracting institutions, but find that 
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property rights institutions are more important.  The argument for the plausibility of 
settler mortality as an instrument hinges on the claim that institutions are historically 
path-dependent (AJR 2001, Pande and Udry 2005).   
 Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), in another well-known paper, argue similarly 
for the path-dependence of institutions.  They compare the Caribbean and South 
American colonies with the North American colonies in the eighteenth century, noting 
that the Caribbean and South American colonies at that time had much higher per 
capita income but also much greater inequality than the North American colonies.  
They then argue that the institutions in the Caribbean and South American colonies 
were set up to maintain inequality and that this limited subsequent growth, whereas 
the more equal North American colonies were much better positioned to take 
advantage of the industrial revolution and grow (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000).  
Obviously this is a great simplification, but in this seminal paper two key points 
emerge.  The first is that institutions do seem to matter; the second is that institutions 
seem slow to change over time.   
 Other papers have also tried to find good instruments for institutions and these 
are surveyed in Pande and Udry (2005).  I will not discuss them further here except to 
note that there has been much contention over the role of geography in these models 
(Pande and Udry 2005).  Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) show no 
significant effects of geography on GDP when they control for institutions, and they 
subsequently claim that it is unimportant.  Sachs takes exception to this, and claims to 
show that if one broadens the sample used by AJR, then geography does have 
significant effects in its own right (Sachs 2003).  Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 
(2005) find that the effects of institutions ―rule‖ over the effects of geography and 
trade integration.  Others try to use some geographical variables as instruments for 
institutions, further complicating the debate (Pande and Udry 2005).  It is clear that 
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most measures of institutions are correlated with geographical variables, but it is not 
clear how important the direct effect of geographical variables are.   
The literature has established that institutions do seem to matter, but the use of 
instrumental variables techniques in this literature generally limits the regressions to 
static estimations and limits the institutional variables to one (Pande and Urdy 2005, 
Rigobon and Rodrik 2005).  Even Rigobon and Rodrik (2005), who use the unique 
indentification through heteroskedasticity estimation technique to get around the 
endogeneity problem, use only two institutional variables.  Their estimations also may 
suffer from selection bias.  The upshot is that this literature has not progressed much 
further than asserting that institutions matter for growth.  Empirical questions of which 
institutions matter and how they change over time have not been addressed 
 It is worth briefly discussing here what types of measurements of institutions 
are being used.  There is a fair amount of data available on institutions of governance 
at the country level.
2
  These data usually are some form of index of corruption, 
democracy, rule of law, etc.  They are most often drawn from surveys, but the surveys 
are often of businessmen, usually foreign, doing business in the country.  There are 
several issues with such data.  The first criticism is that they often capture a 
foreigner’s perspective on particular institutions, which can be subjectively biased 
especially against perceived corruption (Bardhan 1997).  This criticism leads to the 
second, stronger one, which is that all of these data are of a subjective nature, if not in 
the survey questions themselves then in the creation of indices out of these questions 
(Kremer 2004).  Kremer (2004) points out that these measures do not give us any idea 
of where the government is present and absent in a country and what happens when it 
is absent.  Kurtz and Shrank (2007) also argue that such measures fail the basic 
requirements of being representative of the population of interest and relevant to the 
                                                 
2
 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/data.html 
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question at hand.  Possibly because of these limitations, the literature does not discuss 
the institutional data in great detail.  AJR (2001), for instance, use a measure of the 
probability of extraction as their favored variable, but they emphasize that the results 
hold with several other institutional variables as well.   
 The cross country literature in general accepts that institutions matter for long-
term growth, but this view is not without criticism.  Paldam and Gundlach (2008) 
review the evidence and argue that it is more likely that growth causes improvements 
in institutions than the other way around.  Clark (2008), argues that the institutionalist 
explanation for growth does not fit with historical data.  These authors lean towards 
the view that institutions arise endogenously as an economy grows, but that they are 
not likely to be fundamental forces that keep economies from growing.  Avoiding the 
problems caused by this endogeneity in cross country regressions was the original 
motivation of AJR; however, it is possible that other factors may have biased those IV 
results.   
 Interestingly, a new complication to this literature comes from a recent paper 
by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008).  In ―Income and Democracy,‖ 
they focus solely on the effect of national income on democracy, and they find that 
when country fixed effects are added to a panel estimation this income effect becomes 
insignificant.  While their results do not challenge earlier institution papers directly, 
the fact that introducing country fixed effects changes the results so drastically 
suggests that any estimation without country fixed effects may be underspecified.   
 Pande and Udry (2005) point out that the nature of the cross-country approach 
– finding plausible instruments for institutions, usually in variables like settler 
mortality or some measure of geographical distance, limits the interpretation of the 
results.   These instruments are generally fixed in time, so in using them we cannot 
gain any insight into the evolution of institutions themselves and they cannot be 
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included in a fixed effects estimation.  Also, the instruments are correlated with many 
of the available institutional variables above, but given the paucity of instruments 
researchers are limited to only using one or two institutional measure in any 
instrumental specification.  Thus the results conclude that institutions matter, but we 
gain no insight into the mechanisms through which they matter or to the relations 
between different institutions within a country.  I now turn to the micro and meso level 
empirical evidence.  
4. Empirical Evidence at the micro and meso levels 
 We will begin with the ―meso‖ level evidence, where meso in this framework 
simply means within country but not at the individual or micro level.  One important 
issue here is price transmission – to what degree do price changes at the macro level 
affect people in different areas, specifically those in rural areas?  Moser, Barrett and 
Minten (2005), using a unique dataset from Madagascar, find that price transmission 
there is actually very low.  They attribute this to high transport costs and poor 
integration of local markets into regional and national markets.  Part of their 
explanation for high transport costs is poor infrastructure.  Pinstrup-Andersen and 
Shimokawa (2008) review the literature on rural infrastructure and conclude that 
massive investment in infrastructure in developing countries is needed.  They argue 
for international aid to fund such initiatives because infrastructure, a public good, is 
systematically underprovided in developing countries.  They also point to the 
problems of low price transmission and high transport costs due to lack of 
infrastructure.  However, they do not discuss in detail possible explanations for the 
lack of infrastructure and their solution of funding infrastructure projects through 
foreign aid may be of limited use (Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa 2008).  Bates 
and Humphreys (2005) model provision of public goods by an elected government and 
argue that electoral accountability is key for public good provision in Africa.   
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 The emphasis on accountability ties into a large literature on democracy and 
growth.  Schmitter and Karl (1991) argue that accountability is one of the defining 
characteristics of democracy, and Gerring, Bond, Brandt and Moreno (2005) argue 
that a country’s ―stock‖ of democracy is critical for growth.  Rodrick and Wacziarg 
(2004) also argue that democracy is good for growth, but the cross-country evidence is 
limited.  Gerring, Bond, Brandt and Moreno (2005) do not account for endogeneity 
and their result depends on an arbitrary ―interest rate‖ for democracy.  Bates (2006) 
finds that accountability does matter, but also that democratic transitions may lead to 
instability.  Van de Walle (1999) looks carefully at democratic transitions in Africa 
and finds no consistent link between short-term democratic transitions and economic 
outcomes. 
 There is therefore a claim of a general trend that infrastructure is 
systematically under-provided in African countries, possibly due to lack of 
accountability of the government.  These arguments are in line with my expectations, 
but the theory predicted more specifically that pure public goods would be 
underprovided and club goods would be provided to supporters of the group in power.  
Kimenyi (2006) offers some interesting evidence along these lines.  Drawing largely 
from Brockerhoff and Hewett (1998), he presents 11 African countries that have had 
long stable periods with rule by one or two ethnic groups.  In nine out of these eleven, 
the ethnic group(s) of the ruler(s) had a significantly higher percentage of women 
attending school.  Also in nine out of eleven, the ethnic group(s) of the ruler(s) had a 
significantly higher percentage of children receiving complete immunization.  There 
was only one country, Rwanda, where an ethnic group other than the ruler’s had 
significantly better outcomes than the ruler’s group (Kimenyi 2006).   However, the 
ruling Hutus make up ninety percent of the population of Rwanda, while the Tutsi 
minority was highly favored in terms of education during the colonial period.   
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 Kimenyi (2006) also presents evidence, again from Brockerhoff and Hewett 
(1998) that in five of the countries above where they had data, rural communities 
dominated by the ethnic group in power had significantly more ―all weather roads.‖  In 
six countries where data was available, rural communities dominated by the group in 
power had significantly smaller median distances to public health facilities.  Taking 
this into consideration, Kimenyi (2006) argues that schools, immunizations, health 
facilities, and in some cases roads are club goods, and this evidence thus supports our 
theory that club goods will be provided along ethnic lines by the group in power.  
While this evidence supports my theoretical framework, it is still limited.  More work 
could certainly be done along these lines. 
 Rather than looking at which ethnic groups are in or out of power, Miguel and 
Gugerty (2004) take a different approach and uses a measure of ethnic diversity 
(ethno-linguistic fractionalization, or ELF).  They test whether or not ELF affects the 
funding for schools and the maintenance of wells in rural Kenya.  While the national 
government covers most of the costs of Kenyan schools by paying teachers’ salaries, 
local communities are responsible for the costs of books, materials and any expansion 
projects. Their hypothesis is that more ethnically diverse communities will be less 
successful at coordinating to raise such funds.  The data from 100 schools in two 
districts in rural Kenya support this hypothesis.  They find that increased ethnic 
diversity significantly reduces the total funds raised by the local community.  Miguel 
and Gugerty (2004) attribute this affect to greater difficulty in coordination and social 
sanctioning across different ethnic groups.   
 While Miguel and Gugerty’s (2004) argument is interesting, it is not clear that 
ELF is the best measure of the effects of ethnicity, simply because it is not diversity 
itself that drives the results, it is people’s belief that such diversity is a hindrance.  
Indeed in their paper Miguel and Gugerty (2004) mention some interviews with 
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headmasters that gave the impression that the headmasters saw working with different 
ethnic groups as problematic.  Miguel (2004) himself, in a subsequent paper, does a 
similar analysis with a rural district in Tanzania.  Here he finds that ethnic diversity 
has no effect on local school funding or well maintenance.  Miguel (2004) then 
compares this district in Tanzania with one of the ones from Kenya.  He claims that 
they are similar in climate, ethnic variation, level of development and history except 
that one is in Kenya and the other Tanzania.  He therefore attributes the insignificance 
of ethnic diversity in Tanzania to the cumulative effects of President Nyerere’s nation-
building policies that began immediately after independence.  In this case he mentions 
some other interviews with locals in Tanzania, and notes that they said that ethnicity 
does not matter in Tanzania (Miguel 2004).   
 Thus while we have some empirical evidence on ethnicity, it remains a 
complicated task to determine when and where ethnicity matters.  At a national level, 
the differences highlighted by Kimenyi (2006) are interesting, but we are also 
interested in local effects.  Here the limited evidence we have is mixed, and it seems 
that the effects of ethnic diversity cannot be generalized; rather they are specific to an 
area.  Thus it may be better to try to measure directly the institution of interest – be it 
property rights, contract enforcement, or democracy, rather than using data on 
ethnicity because it is available and arguing that it explains the institutional results.  
Put another way, this is to interpret Miguel and Gugerty’s (2004) finding not as 
―ethnic diversity matters,‖ but as ―we observe community level variation in local 
public good provision, and this variation is correlated with ethnic diversity.‖  
One last point of interest here is that both Miguel and Gugerty (2004) and 
Kimenyi (2006) point to some studies on the United States for evidence when 
discussing provision of local public goods and ethnic diversity.  While these studies 
may be helpful methodologically, I do not give any credence to a comparison of these 
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factors between African countries and the United States.  As Miguel (2004) shows, the 
effects of ethnic diversity are not consistent even among two regions with similar 
climates, regions of the world, and histories.  We should not expect them to be the 
same across the U.S. and SSA.   
 There is also some evidence on the role of contract enforcement, property 
rights, and social norms in Africa.  Fafchamps (2004) considers these issues in detail 
in his book, and offers evidence from several case studies of African firms.  He makes 
the following conclusions.  First, the probability that two parties will trade is higher if 
they have traded before.  This is simply a more formal way of saying that relationships 
matter when contract enforcement is not perfect.  He next argues that when two parties 
are strangers, they will likely only transact in cash, on the spot.   Moving on to more 
structural issues, he claims that there are more intermediaries between producer and 
consumer in African countries, and further that these intermediaries capture a large 
share of the gains from trade.  Fafchamps (2004) points out that trade in Africa is often 
more market-based than trade in developed countries, in the sense that it consists of a 
series of spot market transactions.  In developed countries, hierarchal exchange within 
firms is more common and is organized over a longer time frame with a smaller 
percentage of transactions actually taking place in a spot market.   
 Fafchamps’ (2004) conclusions all point to the fact that formal contract 
enforcement is problematic in Africa.  His surveys of traders give some indication of 
this, as they cite many contractual problems and stress the need for flexibility in 
contracts (Fafchamps 2004).  However, these surveys are of businesses that are 
actually functioning and they therefore give no indication of how many potentially 
beneficial transactions do not take place because the costs due to the uncertainty of 
contract enforcement are too high.  His surveys also suggest that businessmen rarely 
go to court to settle disputes, although they do sometimes resort to legal action 
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(Fafchamps 2004).  This result is hard to interpret.  Dixit (2004) models transactions 
―in the shadow of the law,‖ where even with an effective court system, an efficient 
equilibrium only requires a small percentage of disputes to actually go to court.  Here 
it is the reliable threat of going to court and getting a fair outcome that matters.  
Fafchamps’ (2004) surveys cannot tell us what peoples’ expectations were when they 
went to court, or whether the court was biased in some systematic way.   
 Jean-Phillippe Platteau (2000) provides some micro-level examples in his 
book.  While he does not present systematic or representative evidence, he does 
provide enough examples and counter-examples to convince us that studying norms 
and institutions is a difficult process.  He argues as well that when formal contracting 
mechanisms are absent people will transact on the basis of reputation and knowledge 
built through repeated interactions.  He also confirms the predictions of our theoretical 
framework that Africa in general has a legacy of ineffective governments (Platteau 
2000).   
Pande and Udry (2005) also present some evidence from Ghana in their review 
piece.  They have data on land holding institutions in Ghana.  To summarize, land 
there is ―owned‖ by the community, and leaders are charged with distributing land to 
people.  However, they are expected to do so on the basis of need, and to not leave 
anyone out.  There were several examples in the data where leaders had failed to 
distribute land to those who were poor and subsequently lost their high positions.  
Thus redistributive norms are highly prevalent there.  The problem, as characterized 
by Pande and Udry (2005), is that the leaders do not have perfect information on who 
is actually poor and who is not.  There is thus a perception among the people that 
someone who leaves a field fallow must not be poor simply because they can afford to 
leave their field fallow.  The result from their data is that people who are less well 
connected and worse off tend to not leave their land fallow, even when doing so would 
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greatly increase productivity.  Indeed, the authors estimate that one third of the 
possible productivity of the land is lost due to failure to let it lie fallow (Pande and 
Udry 2005).  The equilibrium that results is thus inefficient in production.   
There are no easy solutions to the inefficiency found in the land tenure system 
in Ghana.  The market solution would assign titles to the land and then establish a 
market where these could be bought and sold, thus ensuring that the full productivity 
of each plot would be realized.  However, as Dixit (2004) notes, attempts to put a 
market system of land rights in place where a traditional system already exists have 
largely backfired because many people do not recognize the rights as defined in the 
new system.  They still rely on the traditional system, and the result can be direct 
conflicts between the systems as a few people switch to the new but most still rely on 
the old.  What follows then is confusion and conflict rather than the efficient outcome 
expected by the theory.  Difficulty in finding appropriate policies is a consistent theme 
in this literature (Fafchamps 2004).  
My theoretical model points to the possibility of civil war as different groups 
vie for the recognition and rents that accrue to the formal government.  Indeed post-
colonial Africa has had a large share of civil conflicts.
3
  However, it is not surprising 
that there is very little data on countries that have had conflicts.  In one case, Sierra 
Leone, there is a post-war survey that reports the degree of violence in different 
regions (Bellows and Miguel 2007).  Bellows and Miguel (2007) have begun to use 
this to test some basic hypotheses about the amount of violence in a region and its 
subsequent standard of living.  However, all they have found so far is that in regions 
that experienced greater violence more people are politically active and more people 
are religiously affiliated (Bellows and Miguel 2007).  We do not have any idea what 
the long term effects of such conflict will be.   
                                                 
3
 See the Correlates of War datasets: http://www.cow.org 
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Perhaps of more direct policy interest is finding ways to prevent conflict.  
Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004) use rainfall in Africa as an instrument for 
growth and then analyze the effects of negative growth shocks on the probability of 
civil conflict.  They find that a five percent negative growth shock increases the 
likelihood of civil conflict by one-half.  Their paper is an improvement over the earlier 
literature led by Collier and Hoeffler (1998), which did not take into account the 
endogeneity of civil conflict, but many questions about the causes and costs of civil 
conflict in Africa remain.  
In a review of empirical evidence that has thus far emphasized the limited 
nature of the results and the myriad difficulties in estimating institutional effects and 
finding appropriate policies, I shall conclude with a more positive review of what 
Robinson and Parsons (2006) dub the exception to the theory of neo-patrimonialism: 
Botswana.  Botswana is exceptional in Africa for its consistent growth, for its stable 
government, and for its successful management of its natural resources.  Robinson and 
Parsons (2006) point out that Botswana has accomplished all of this despite being a 
low-population density African country, thus seemingly defying the theory outlined 
above of weak states due to low population densities and no competition for territory 
(Herbst 2000).  However, it is clear in their own review of Botswana’s history that 
several factors set it apart even before the colonial period (Robinson and Parsons 
2006).   
Before they were formally colonized in the late nineteenth century, the Tswana 
people were already organized and protecting their land and interests from the threats 
of the Boers and the British in South Africa (Robinson and Parsons 2006).  Thus they 
already established some common identity by the time they were colonized, and they 
maintained an identity through colonization.  At independence, the Tswana then 
played a large role in shaping the subsequent institutional set up of the new nation.  
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They integrated smaller groups into their coalition, and benefited from a consistent set 
of shared interests: almost everyone in the country was involved in cattle-ranching at 
that time.  Thus the government actually represented all of the people, as opposed to 
other countries that saw the establishment of governments partial to a particular group.  
The Tswana-dominated government then protected the interests of its constituents, but 
in this case the constituents were the entire nation and almost all had similar interests 
and needs (Robinson and Parsons 2006).  Thus I would argue that Botswana’s success 
is not the perfect counterexample to our theoretical expectations, it is simply an 
African nation with reasonable territorial boundaries and few ethnic divisions.  Its 
policies have therefore been productive and served its people well.   
 Of particular note in Botswana is how the country has avoided the resource 
curse (Robinson and Parsons 2006).  Large diamond deposits were discovered in the 
early 1970s, and these have been the base of a steady industry ever since.  The 
government has made sure to invest the surplus from the diamonds back into 
infrastructure and other productive activities, and they have also negotiated favorable 
terms with De Beers that protected Botswana’s interests (Robinson and Parsons 2006).  
Botswana also scores highly on most measures of governance, especially compared to 
other African countries.  In a measure of regulatory structure, Botswana actually ranks 
higher than Portugal and France (Robinson and Parsons 2006).  Although these 
measures are limited, it is encouraging to know that one African country that has 
created effective institutions is one that has been stable and successful.   
 The literature on institutions in Africa is at a point where it has been 
established that institutions are important, but we have very little indication of which 
ones matter relatively more or less, the mechanisms through which they develop and 
change, and the degree to which they can even be compared across regions and 
countries.  Policy prescriptions are even more troublesome; Dixit (2005) points out 
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that literature in several areas related to institutions suggests diametrically opposed 
policies and Fafchamps (2004) emphasizes the great difficulty of prescribing simple 
changes to complex processes.   
 Much work remains to be done to understand how institutions in Africa relate 
to economic growth.  More empirical evidence is needed, but any attempt to clearly 
identify the effects of institutions must account for the endogeneity of institutions to 
economic outcomes, address the many problems in the measurement of institutional 
variables and determine a level of analysis where the results can inform policy.  This 
dissertation seeks to contribute to the empirical evidence on institutions in Africa.   
My hope is to improve our understanding of how institutions relate to economic 
growth and to provide policy advice for African countries.   
5. Introduction of the subsequent chapters 
The three subsequent chapters will each consist of a paper that analyzes 
institutions in Africa with different data and at different levels of analysis.  Chapter 
two uses regional measures of institutions created from Afrobarometer surveys, which 
allow for analysis of institutions within African countries at one administrative level 
down from the national government.  Using Afrobaromter surveys allows me to 
construct new measures of institutions, specifically focusing on security, law 
enforcement and corruption.  These regional institutional variables are then combined 
with household wealth measures from DHS surveys.  By using a household dependent 
variable with regional institutional variables I am able to avoid the endogeneity 
problem that plagues the cross country literature.   
Chapter two shows that regional variation in institutions matters in Africa.  
Specifically, fear of crime is costly and improving courts is generally good, but the 
interactions matter – improving courts is most effective when crime is seen as a 
problem and people trust the government.  Improving courts is detrimental if there is 
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not a crime problem and there is no trust of the government, especially in non-urban 
regions.  The analysis also shows the dual facets of corruption; it can be harmful at 
higher levels but helpful at lower levels of government.  The chapter establishes that 
institutions do vary within African countries, as expected, and that this variation is 
important for household wealth.   
 The third chapter, written with Christine Moser, takes the analysis of 
institutions to a much lower level within a single country.  The general consensus is 
that institutions matter at the country level and chapter two shows that they matter at 
the regional level as well in Africa.  Chapter three looks even lower, at the commune 
level in Madagascar.  There are over 1500 communes in Madagascar, akin to counties 
in the U.S, and we use a unique data set from Madagascar to analyze institutions in 
Madagascar’s communes.   
We show that institutions do matter at such a low level and we further consider 
the effects of subjective security, public goods and formal property rights on the 
development of manufacturing in the communes.  After testing for fixed effects and 
controlling for endogeneity and spatial bias in a large sample, we find that formal 
property rights are the key driver of both the development of manufacturing and the 
level of infrastructure in Madagascar’s communes.   
Chapter four returns to country level analysis.  In it I make several 
methodological improvements to determine the country level effects of 
democratization in Africa.  I introduce an instrument, the weighted average of 
neighboring countries’ Polity scores, which allows for IV estimation including time 
and country fixed effects.  I also estimate a simultaneous equations model that 
includes time and country fixed effects.  
I find that when fixed effects are included, institutional variables are clearly 
insignificant in cross country IV regressions.  However, the simultaneous equations 
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model indicates a strong effect of Executive Constraints on both economic growth and 
GDP per capita in Africa.  I also find that Polity significantly reduces the Death Rate 
in African countries.  The simultaneous equations model gives a test of the 
overidentifying restrictions of the model, and this test indicates no evidence against 
the restrictions.  I thus prefer the simultaneous equations estimates to the IV estimates 
because they account for all endogenous variables.  The results indicate that 
democratization may be very good for growth in Africa.  
This dissertation begins with the empirical result that institutions seem to 
matter for growth and a theoretical framework as to how they might matter in Africa 
(AJR, Acemoglu and Johnson 2005, Herbst 2000).  In three papers, I investigate four 
possible mechanisms through which institutions may affect growth – property rights, 
contract enforcement, security and corruption – at three different levels of analysis.  
Table 1 broadly summarizes the results.  
Table 1: Summary of Estimated Institutional Impact on Growth at Different Levels 
 Local level  
(chapter 3) 
Regional level 
(chapter 2) 
Country level 
(chapter 4) 
Property Rights Significant 
Estimated effect 
on development of 
manufacturing 
Not measured Significant 
estimated effect in 
simultaneous 
equations model 
Contract 
Enforcement 
Not significant  Significant 
estimated effect of 
expectations of 
law enforcement 
Not measured 
Security Not significant Significant 
estimated effect of 
fear of crime 
Not significant 
Corruption Not measured Significant 
estimated effects 
of corruption in 
police and reps. 
Not measured 
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 I find that property rights institutions have significant positive estimated 
effects on growth at the local level and the country level.  These results are consistent 
with much of the literature on institutions and growth, and the variables and estimation 
techniques in chapters 3 and 4 are also similar to the literature.  The regional level 
analysis in chapter 2 uses new institutional variables and a different identification 
strategy, and the results there are quite different from the other chapters.  I find that 
contract enforcement, security and corruption all have jointly significant estimated 
effects on wealth in a nonlinear specification.  Unfortunately, I do not measure 
property rights at the regional level, contract enforcement at the country level or 
corruption at the local or country level.  It is therefore impossible to determine at this 
juncture whether the differences in estimated effects at different levels stem from the 
identification strategies, the way the institutional variables are constructed, or the 
omission of certain pathways at different levels.   
This dissertation has analyzed institutions and economic growth at three 
different levels and begun to investigate which institutional mechanisms are the most 
important.  However, more work is still needed, particularly at the regional and local 
levels where data is scarce.  I have been as rigorous as possible, but the data used in 
each chapter still has significant limitations.  New data and analysis is needed to test 
further the results shown here and other hypotheses about institutions and economic 
growth.  
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 Institutions Matter, but in Surprising Ways: 
 
New Evidence on Institutions in Africa 
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I. Introduction 
It has long been argued that certain political institutions are necessary for 
economic growth, (North 1990) and recent years have seen many attempts to 
quantitatively show that institutions matter (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001, 
Rodrik et al. 2004, Rigobon and Rodrik 2005, Bates 2006).  However, cross-country 
regressions are mired in problems of endogeneity with very few instrumental 
variables, and quantitative micro-level evidence on institutions typically comes from 
small samples and is not generalizable (Pande and Udry 2005, Fafchamps 2004).  
Thus the literature has on the one hand country-level studies that assert that 
institutions matter but cannot identify which ones and on the other hand micro and 
meso level works that point to specific institutions – property rights, contracts, crime, 
trust or corruption – but do not have representative samples.  This paper brings both 
parts of the literature together.  I use household wealth with regional institutional 
variables to identify the effects of multiple institutions on wealth in a large 
representative sample covering thirteen African countries.   
This analysis confirms the assertion of the country-level literature that 
institutions matter, but also shows that within country variation in institutions is 
important.  It further tests the effects of several institutions.  I find that reducing fear 
of crime is beneficial for wealth, while improving the legal system is beneficial if fear 
of crime or trust in national government is high.  Corruption in different levels of 
government has positive and negative effects on wealth.  The effects of institutions are 
nonlinear and there are significant differences between urban and non urban regions.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II provides background on 
macro and micro/meso work on institutions. Section III discusses in detail the data on 
institutions used here, measurement issues and the estimation strategy.  Section IV 
presents the results and Section V discusses them in detail.  Section VI concludes.  
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II. Background 
 Although interest in the economic effects of political institutions is a 
longstanding question in economics (North 1990, Becker 1969, Becker and Stigler 
1974), quantitative research on institutions is a relatively recent phenomenon.  
Sparked by the works of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, hereafter AJR) and 
Sokoloff and Engerman (2000), economists have begun an attempt to econometrically 
identify the effects of institutions in cross-country regressions.  The main estimation 
problem is endogeneity, so most of the literature concerns itself with finding 
appropriate instruments for institutions (AJR, Rodrik et al. 2004, Bardhan 2005, Pande 
and Udry 2005).  However, good instruments are rare, and the results are often 
difficult to interpret.  The use of instruments generally limits the regressions to static 
estimations and limits the institutional variables to one (Pande and Udry 2005, 
Rigobon and Rodrik 2005).  Even Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who make use of all 
available plausible instruments, use only two institutional variables.  The upshot is that 
this literature has not progressed much further than asserting that institutions matter 
for growth.  Empirical questions of which institutions matter and how they change 
over time are difficult to address in cross-country research.  
 Micro and meso level research on institutions has identified some of the 
institutions that may be important.  The importance of property rights is a common 
theme from broad macro-level work (Bates 2006, AJR) to surveys of African traders 
carried out by Fafchamps (2004) and Fafchamps and Minten (2001).  The latter two 
works emphasize that relationships and trust are very important in economic 
transactions among African traders.  Fafchamps and Moser (2003) as well as 
Fafchamps and Minten (2001) emphasize the negative effect of crime on trade – not 
always through measurable theft, but through the costly adjustments made by 
individuals to avoid theft.  These works all also discuss the importance of contract 
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enforcement.  The court system is very important for the threat of legal action, even if 
few disputes are actually settled there.  Dixit (2004) models this enforcement ―in the 
shadow of the law,‖ and both Dixit (2004) and Fafchamps (2004) refer to a long 
literature on the importance of contract enforcement for economic development.  
 Other research argues for the importance of infrastructure for growth.  
Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa (2006) argue that infrastructure is systematically 
under-provided in African countries.  Moser, Barrett and Minten (2005) explore how 
transactions costs due to poor infrastructure in Madagascar lead to poor price 
transmission and low market integration, and Kimenyi (2006) argues that public goods 
such as roads and schools have in many cases in Africa been distributed along ethnic 
lines.  Bates and Humphreys (2005) model provision of public goods by an elected 
government and argue that electoral accountability is key for public good provision in 
Africa.   
 The emphasis on accountability ties into a large literature on democracy and 
growth.  Schmitter and Karl (1991) argue that accountability is one of the defining 
characteristics of democracy, and Gerring, Bond, Brandt and Moreno (2005) argue 
that a country’s ―stock‖ of democracy is critical for growth.  Rodrick and Wacziarg 
(2004) also argue that democracy is good for growth, but the cross-country evidence is 
limited.  Gerring, Bond, Brandt and Moreno (2005) do not account for endogeneity 
and their result depends on an arbitrary ―interest rate‖ for democracy.  Bates (2006) 
finds that accountability does matter, but also that democratic transitions may lead to 
instability.  Van de Walle (1999) looks carefully at democratic transitions in Africa 
and finds no consistent link between short-term democratic transitions and economic 
outcomes.   
 Finally, corruption has received a good deal of attention in the literature.  
Bardhan (1997) offers a review, and emphasizes that theoretically corruption can 
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decrease efficiency by raising transactions costs, but it can also increase efficiency by 
allowing individuals to bypass distortionary policies.  The World Bank has sought to 
root out corruption in developing countries and Easterly (2006) argues that 
governments in developing countries are so corrupt that aid given to them will be 
wasted.  Sachs (2005), on the other hand, claims that governments in Africa are 
reasonably good given their level of development and that corruption is not a big 
problem. 
 The quantitative literature on institutions and economic development is still in 
the early stages.  The cross-country literature, relying heavily on IV methods, confirms 
that institutions matter for growth, but cannot tell us which ones or how.  Many other 
works point to specific institutions: crime, contracts, property rights, accountability 
and corruption, but the evidence is either from small samples or from questionable 
cross-country regressions.  This paper begins to fill in the questions of which 
institutions matter and how they affect economic outcomes with quantitative evidence 
from nationally representative surveys in thirteen African countries.    
III. Methods and Data 
What are institutions and what can we measure? 
 The empirical literature on institutions is vague with regards to what 
institutions are and how they can be measured.  I will thus attempt to offer some 
clarity before proceeding.  Institutions are rules that form people’s expectations of 
others’ behavior (North 1990).  The economic study of institutions focuses on how 
different rules affect economic outcomes.  For example, it is widely accepted that a set 
of rules defining what is property and respecting ownership of property (even against 
the government) are beneficial for economic efficiency and investment.   
The key to this definition is that institutions are rules, which presents 
difficulties in terms of measurement.  Informal rules/institutions cannot be directly 
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measured; formal rules can in theory be measured directly.  In practice, what matters 
is how the formal rules/laws are applied, and it is unlikely that the formal reading of a 
rule will map exactly onto its application.  Thus formal rules present measurement 
difficulties as well, particularly in a developing country context where law 
enforcement may be ineffective, as is the case for most of the African countries 
studied in this paper. 
 While rules cannot be reliably measured, outcomes and expectations can.  
However, such measurements link only indirectly to the institutions themselves, which 
is an unavoidable problem in this type of research.  Outcome based measures have the 
advantage of being objective but the disadvantage of being noisy.  For example, one 
can measure the levels of various public goods, the pay and education level of judges, 
or the number of murders or robberies in a society, which are all outcomes that depend 
on the institutions of governance and public good allocation.  However, these 
outcomes map very imprecisely back to the institutions themselves.  The level of 
public goods tells us nothing about the rules of allocation, higher judicial pay and 
education cannot tell us if there are biases in a legal system and lower crime rates 
themselves give no indication of who provides security and what measures individuals 
take to avoid crime.   
 Some surveys thus measure expectations directly.  These measures have the 
advantage of being less noisy but the disadvantage of being subjective.  They capture 
peoples’ perceptions of how others will behave, which can then be linked back to 
institutions.  For example, consider the institutions surrounding basic security.  If a 
society is secure, all people follow the rule of not harming others, which then leads to 
the expectation that people do not harm each other.  If the security is perfect, then both 
the objective measure (no crime is reported) and the subjective measure (people do not 
expect to be harmed) give an accurate measure of the institution.  However, consider 
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the situation where objective crime rates are low but not zero.  These rates could arise 
because security is good and almost everyone follows the rule of not harming others, 
but   low rates could also arise if most people engage in opportunistic crime.  If 
everyone follows the rule: commit crime opportunistically (i.e. steal when it is easy), 
the expectation is that others will steal from you if you do not protect your goods, so 
everyone makes costly adjustments.  The result is that objective crime is still low, but 
only because people always travel in large groups, lock their doors and do not leave 
goods unattended.  Objective measures of crime cannot differentiate between these 
two situations, but subjective measures can.  This distinction is important because the 
economic implications of the two different security institutions are vastly different. 
Subjective measures thus have some advantage over objective measures.  It is 
critical, however, that subjective measures capture the perceptions of people who are 
relevant to the institution and the economic outcome and that they are representative 
of the population of interest.  Many of the subjective indicators of institutions that are 
commonly used in the literature do not meet these criteria of being representative and 
relevant.  The governance indicators constructed by the World Bank
4
 and the indices 
of legal formalism used by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) rely on the perceptions of 
―experts‖ (i.e. lawyers or scholars) who are in no way representative of the population 
of interest (Kurtz and Schrank 2007, Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005).  
Furthermore, many of the commonly used institutional measures are some form of 
index that has an arbitrary weighting system, which introduces further noise into the 
measurement.   
I therefore develop subjective expectations-based measures of institutions from 
Afrobarometer surveys that capture relevant institutions, are representative of the 
                                                 
4
 The world bank indicators are available at 
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata/ 
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population of interest and avoid arbitrary indexing.
5
  Afrobarometer surveys are 
nationally representative surveys that ask questions about democracy, corruption, 
governance, etc.  The Afrobarometer surveys are stratified into regions/provinces and 
then further into urban and rural areas of each region/province.  This stratification 
allows for the construction of regional variables that are representative due to the 
random selection of observations at the regional level.  I created regional variables 
from the individual responses in the Afrobarometer surveys and matched them to 
household data from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in thirteen African 
countries where data were available.  Each Afrobarometer variable corresponds to the 
perceptions of a percentage of the population of a region.
6
   
Fear of Crime 
In the example above I presented two possible security institutions: do not 
harm others and commit crime opportunistically.  Since opportunistic crime leads to 
costly adjustments, it will have a negative effect on wealth.  Fafchamps and Minten 
(2001) and Fafchamps and Moser (2003) point out that crime is problematic in Africa 
for precisely this reason.  The Afrobarometer surveys ask people how often they fear 
crime, with the possible responses being never, rarely, sometimes, a lot or always.  
This forms the first regional variable, Crime, which measures the percentage of people 
in a region who fear crime rarely, sometimes, a lot or all of the time.  This variable 
measures peoples’ expectations of opportunistic crime.  The first hypothesis follows 
naturally:  
                                                 
5
 See www.afrobarometer.org  
6
 See appendix 1 for a complete description of how the variables were constructed and 
a comparison with other measures of institutions.  Afrobarometer data can be found at 
www.afrobarometer.org  DHS data can be found at www.measuredhs.com 
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Hypothesis 1: Living in a region where fear of crime is higher will result in 
lower household wealth.  The sign of the estimated coefficient on Crime 
should be negative.  
This first hypothesis reflects my general expectation of the effect of Crime on 
wealth, other things being equal.  However, it is possible that the levels of other 
variables may affect the impact of Crime on wealth.  For example, Crime may have a 
smaller impact on wealth in places where law enforcement is good and corruption 
among the police is low and vice versa.  Crime also may have larger effects in urban 
areas.  I will therefore empirically consider interactions of Crime with other 
institutional variables and the effects of Crime in urban and non-urban areas.   
Contract and Law Enforcement 
 Fafchamps (2004) refers to a large literature that argues that contract 
enforcement is important for development.  Indeed, a fundamental part of market 
economics that is often taken for granted is the ability of anonymous individuals to 
engage in intertemporal trade.  Such transactions require institutions of trust on the 
parts of the individuals and enforcement in the case of breach or hold up.  Dixit (2004) 
models how the effectiveness of courts matters even when few disputes ever reach a 
courtroom; it is the legitimate threat of going to court that improves contract 
enforcement.  
 The Afrobarometer surveys contain three questions that pertain directly to law 
enforcement.  The best of these asks people how likely it is the law will be enforced if 
someone obtains goods or services without paying, but this variable is not available in 
all Afrobarometer surveys.  The other two, which are available in all surveys, ask how 
likely it is the law will be enforced if someone does not pay their taxes or if someone 
commits a serious crime.  Law-tax is the percentage of people who think it is very 
likely the law will be enforced if someone does not pay their taxes, and Law-crime is 
 39 
the same if someone commits a serious crime.   The second regional variable, Law, is 
a weighted sum of Law-tax and Law-crime.
7
   This variable captures people’s 
expectations of law enforcement, which measure the degree to which institutions of 
formal law enforcement are present. It is increasing in the expectation that the law will 
be enforced.  
Hypothesis 2: Living in regions with better systems of law and contract 
enforcement will result in greater household wealth.  The estimated coefficient 
on Law should be positive.  
As with the Crime variable, hypothesis two reflects a general expectation of 
the effect of better law enforcement on wealth.  However, the effect of Law may 
depend on the levels of other variables so I will once again consider interactions of 
Law with other variables such as Crime.   
Trust 
 The fundamental point made above is that anonymous individuals need to be 
able to engage in economic transactions for markets to function efficiently.  Another 
way to measure how well institutions in a region allow this is by asking people about 
their general level of trust of people they know, of strangers, and of the government.  
The expectation is that the higher the general level of trust, the better the institutional 
framework is for anonymous transactions.  General levels of trust are expected to 
correlate positively with effective systems of property rights and contract enforcement.  
 There are five measures of trust that I used from the Afrobarometer surveys: 
how much people trust the army, the courts, the police, their national representative, 
and their local representative.  The first four of these are highly correlated, so I use 
                                                 
7
 The weights were derived through factor analysis.  See Appendix 2 for a description 
of the factor techniques and the loadings for each factor.  
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Trust Army and Trust Local Rep as the third and fourth regional variables.
8
  These 
simply measure the percentage of people who trust the army or their local 
representative a lot.  They capture peoples’ expectations of the general level of trust.  
Hypothesis 3: living in a region with higher levels of trust will lead to greater 
wealth. The estimated coefficient on both trust variables should be positive. 
Corruption 
 Corruption is likely to be present in most African countries, and the World 
Bank has put together programs to fight corruption.  However, economic theory shows 
that corruption could have negative or positive effects on wealth (Bardhan 1997).  
Paldam and Gundlach (2008) aptly dub these two effects the ―cost effect,‖ which is the 
negative effect of increased transactions costs due to corruption, and the ―grease 
effect,‖ which is the positive effect of corruption enabling beneficial transactions to 
take place.  The net effect of corruption is therefore an empirical question.  I generally 
expect that corruption in African countries decreases efficiency because governments 
are unlikely to be strongly enforcing distortionary regulations.   
There are three relevant questions on corruption in Afrobarometer: how people 
view the level of corruption in their representatives, judges, and police.  The 
corruption measures in representatives and judges are highly correlated, so I only use 
corruption in representatives and police in the regression.  The fifth and sixth regional 
variables, Reps Corrupt and Police Corrupt, measure the percentage of people who 
think that some or all of their representatives or policemen are corrupt.  These are 
measures of peoples’ expectations of corruption.   
                                                 
8
 Using any one of the first four trust measures did not change the results in any 
significant way 
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Hypothesis 4: living in a region with higher levels of corruption decreases 
household wealth.  The estimated coefficients on Reps Corrupt and Police 
Corrupt should be negative.  
As with the other institutional variables, the effects of corruption on wealth 
may depend on the levels of Law or whether the area is urban.  Hypothesis four thus 
represents my general expectation of the effect, but I will consider interactions as well.  
Table 2 summarizes the Afrobarometer variables. 
Table 2: Summary Statistics of Afrobarometer Variables 
Institution Variable What it measures Hypothesis Mean Std. 
Dev.  
Opportunistic 
Crime 
Crime Percentage who 
fear crime at least a 
little 
Negative 
effect on 
wealth 
0.33 0.17 
Contract / Law 
Enforcement 
Law Percentage who 
think it very likely 
the law will be 
enforced for taxes 
and serious crimes 
Positive 
effect on 
wealth 
*0.00 1.00 
Trust Trust Army Percentage who 
trust national 
government a lot 
Positive 
effect on 
wealth 
0.34 0.31 
 Trust Local 
Rep 
Percentage who 
trust local reps a lot 
Positive 
effect on 
wealth 
0.42 0.22 
Corruption Reps 
Corrupt 
Percentage who 
think some or all 
reps are corrupt 
Negative 
effect on 
wealth 
0.60 0.18 
 Police 
Corrupt 
Percentage who 
think some or all 
police are corrupt 
Negative 
effect on 
wealth 
0.40 0.17 
*The mean of Law is zero because it is a weighted sum of two variables; see Appendix 2. 
Endogeneity 
 Endogeneity is the fundamental econometric problem in this type of analysis.   
The most common techniques to avoid endogeneity are to use instrumental variables 
(IV) and/or to use lags of the independent variables.  I take a different approach here 
which is to identify the effects of institutions through a multilevel specification.  This 
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section defines the problem of endogeneity and discusses the differences in using lags, 
using IV methods and the multilevel strategy used here.  
 Endogeneity is often referred to as a problem of reverse causality (Acemoglu 
and Johnson 2005), but the term reverse causality suggests that causality either runs 
from institutions to growth or from growth to institutions, or possibly both.  In reality, 
what we have are governments that make choices.  Institutions are typically thought of 
as being chosen or at least being directly affected by the choices of governments, as 
are the economic outcomes of interest.  Thus both institutions and growth are 
endogenous to the governments’ choices.   
 The argument that lags of an independent variable are exogenous even if the 
contemporaneous variable is endogenous follows from the reverse causality logic.  If 
the problem is that growth in the present may cause institutions in the present, a 
natural argument is that growth in the present cannot cause institutions in the past.  
However, when the problem is cast as one of government choices affecting both 
institutions and growth, this logic breaks down.  Government choices in the past were 
made with consideration of the future in mind, so both growth in the present and 
institutions in the past are impacted by government choices in the past.  In general, the 
choices of the government in the past affect both institutions and growth in the past 
and in the present, so using lags to avoid endogeneity fails.  
There may be cases where there has been a regime change such that the 
choices of the past government are exogenous to present outcomes.  In that case data 
from the old regime could plausibly instrument for the present institutions.  This 
argument leads to the IV method.   
The IV method consists of finding some clearly exogenous variables that meet 
an exclusion restriction, which says that they affect the dependent variable only 
indirectly through their effect on the endogenous variable.  This restriction is not 
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directly testable, so the success of an instrument hinges on the plausibility of the 
argument that the exclusion restriction is met.  There are very few plausible 
instruments for country level institutions, which limits what can be identified through 
this method.  At best, two institutional variables may be included in an IV regression 
of growth or GDP on institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson2005).   
 Since lags are not exogenous and instruments are rare, this paper uses a 
multilevel identification strategy that consists of regressing a household level measure 
of wealth on household controls and aggregate institutional variables.  The assumption 
necessary for this strategy to succeed is that households treat institutions as exogenous 
to their choices about consumption and production.
 9
   Since institutions are typically 
thought of as being chosen by governments at a highly aggregated level, this 
assumption is relatively innocuous.
 10
  It is similar to the standard economic 
assumption that individuals are price-takers, even though prices are jointly determined 
by the actions of all individuals.  It is thus arguably far less demanding than the typical 
exclusion restrictions required for IV estimation, and this strategy has the further 
benefit of identifying multiple institutional variables and their interactions. 
Household Data   
 The drawback of the multilevel strategy is that the results are the effects of 
institutions on household wealth rather than on national growth.  However, policies 
                                                 
9
 The concern is often raised that this technique is equivalent to regressing regional 
means of the household variable on the regional variables and thus is still endogenous.  
See appendix 3 for a proof that this is not the case since household controls are used. 
10
 One can imagine a model where it is not.  For example, if households choose where 
to live based on a vector of institutions at each location, then the resulting institutions 
could arise endogenously due to household selection into different locations (the 
―voting with their feet‖ idea).  For this model to make sense, one needs moving costs 
to be low, which implies that locations are close together, that other considerations 
(like wages) change little across locations, and that people are free to move.  None of 
these conditions are met in the data used here:  institutions vary across regions that are 
large and differ greatly on dimensions other than institutions. 
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that on average increase household wealth should lead to aggregate growth.  The 
household wealth variables are from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS), which 
are large, nationally representative surveys, so the results are generalizable at least to 
the countries in the sample.
11
  These surveys follow a standard form and have been 
carried out in many developing countries.  They ask a wide variety of questions 
ranging from education and household characteristics to individual health and 
anthropometric information.  However, DHS surveys do not measure income or 
wealth directly.  They do measure the presence of goods in the household such as 
radio, television, electricity, etc.  These variables are indicators of wealth, so I use 
wealth factor scores created from them.   
 There are several ways to create factor scores, and some DHS surveys include 
wealth factor scores derived by the principal components method.  I prefer minimum 
distance techniques because they give greater weight to more precise indicators, fit a 
specific model, and provide a test of fit.  I created wealth factor scores for the pooled 
data from all thirteen countries using minimum distance factor analysis.
12
  These 
scores are the dependent variables in the regressions.  At the household level I use the 
education, age, and gender of the household head as well as an indicator for urban 
areas as independent variables.  I also created some regional controls from the DHS 
data.  These include the mean education level in each region and a public goods factor 
score which was created from the regional mean levels of five goods (piped water, 
flush toilets, electricity, telephone, and dirt floors).
13
  Table 3 presents summary 
statistics of the DHS data.  
                                                 
11
 The countries are Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia.   
12
 Please see Appendix 2 for a full description of the technique. 
13
 This factor score was also created using minimum distance techniques as described 
in Appendix 2.  The variables were too highly correlated to include in the regression 
together, thus factor analysis is used as a variable reduction technique here.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics of DHS Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max 
Wealth 0.00 1.00 -0.74 2.65 
Incomplete Primary Ed. 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Complete Primary Ed. 0.12 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Incomplete Secondary Ed. 0.14 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Complete Secondary Ed, 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Higher Ed, 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
Age 45.52 16.04 9.00 98.00 
Female 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Urban 0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Public Goods Factor Score 0.00 1.00 -0.82 3.50 
Mean years of Education 5.14 2.61 0.62 11.91 
 
IV. Estimation and Results 
 I carried out weighted least squares estimation (the weights are the DHS 
survey weights) with wealth factor scores at the household level as the dependent 
variable.  The household level independent variables are education dummies for level 
completed, age and age squared and dummies for female household head and urban 
area.  The estimated coefficients on these household variables are significant and have 
the expected signs, which increases confidence in the wealth factor scores as a 
reasonable measure of wealth.
14
  The regional variables are the six Afrobarometer 
regional institutional variables, two Afrobarometer controls,
15
 the two DHS regional 
controls, and a regional level indicator for regions that are entirely urban (other 
regions are mostly rural but may be partly urban).
16
  All estimations include dummies 
for the thirteen countries and adjust the standard errors for the regional clusters.
17
   
                                                 
14
 See the full regression reports in Appendix 4 for the coefficients on these variables 
15
 These variables, Contact Local Rep and Contact National Rep, measure the 
percentage of people in a region who never contact their local or national 
representatives.   
16
 Several specifications were tried with different formulations of the wealth factor 
scores and using Law-tax alone rather than Law.  In general, the results are robust to 
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 Table 4 presents the results.  I began with the broadest possible model that 
includes each regional variable, its square and interactions with all other regional 
variables.  Given this large set of closely related variables, multicollinearity could be a 
problem, so I first eliminated the interaction terms that had a correlation greater than 
.75 with any other variable.  From this broad regression I then tested to see if a simpler 
specification was appropriate.  I was able to clearly reject the joint test that all the 
interaction terms were zero and the joint test that all of the squared terms were zero, so 
the nonlinear specification is correct.  While a linear specification would be easier to 
interpret, the results here indicate that a linear specification of the institutional 
variables would be inappropriate.     
I next eliminated some of the institutional variables by considering each 
insignificant variable (at the 10% level) in turn and comparing a regression without 
that variable to one with it.  If the coefficients on other variables changed when I 
dropped a variable, I kept that variable in the final specification so as to not introduce 
bias.  Some of the variables were dropped, so the final specification does not include 
all of the interactions and squared terms in the initial regression, but it is still highly 
nonlinear.   
Since the appropriate specification is nonlinear, I cannot present simple linear 
coefficients to test hypotheses.  Instead, I follow the standard practice for nonlinear 
specifications of reporting the marginal effects of each variable at the means of any 
interacted variables, with one exception.  The urban variable is an indicator for regions 
                                                                                                                                            
variations in how the factor scores were created.  The Law-tax variable was jointly 
significant only at the ten percent level, but Law was significant at one percent, which 
suggests that more than just the perception of tax enforcement is important for wealth.  
17
 To test the robustness I also computed standard errors under homoskedasticty, 
general heteroskedasticity (White estimator) and clusters at the country level.  The p-
values in table 3 only change marginally with these different calculations and all 
variables remain significant. 
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that are entirely urban, so it does not make sense to report a marginal effect for the 
average region that is partially urban when in reality the regions are either completely 
urban or almost entirely rural.  The results presented in table 3 are therefore the 
marginal effects of each variable and its interactions calculated at the regional means 
for urban and non-urban regions.  To test for the significance of a particular variable I 
then present the p-value of the joint test of the variable and all of its interactions.    
 
Table 4: Marginal Effects of Institutional Variables  
Variable Marginal Effect at Means Hypothesis Confirmed? 
 Non Urban Urban Joint p-value   
Crime -0.161 -0.310 0.00 negative yes 
Law  0.004  0.067 0.01 positive yes 
Trust Army  0.233 -0.278 0.00 positive no 
Trust Local Rep -0.312 -1.182 0.00 positive no 
Reps Corrupt  0.047 -1.403 0.00 negative yes 
Police Corrupt  0.504  1.791 0.00 negative no 
Regressions by weighted least squares with 118,262 observations and 151 regions.  Wealth factor 
scores are the dependent variable; they are standardized so the units are standard deviations.  
 
V. Discussion 
 Hypothesis 1 says that living in a region where fear of crime is higher will 
decrease household wealth.  This hypothesis is supported by the data.  The effect of 
the Crime variable is negative at the regional means and significant at the one percent 
level.  Crime has a stronger negative effect on wealth in urban regions.  In non-urban 
regions an increase of the Crime variable by one standard deviation is estimated to 
decrease wealth by 0.03 standard deviations on average; in urban regions a standard 
deviation increase in Crime on average reduces wealth by 0.05 standard deviations. 
The effect of Crime also interacts positively with Law.  Figure one plots the marginal 
effect of Crime as Law varies across its range, holding all other variables at their 
means.  It shows clearly that fear of crime has a stronger deleterious effect on wealth 
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when expectations of law enforcement are lower.  This interaction suggests that 
improving the legal system will lessen the negative effect of crime on wealth.  
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Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Crime with Law 
  
Hypothesis 2 says that living in a region with a better legal system will 
increase wealth.  The effect of Law is significant, but the marginal effect is near zero 
at the regional means in non-urban regions.  This result is due in part to calculating the 
marginal effect at the means; the coefficients on Law also are smaller in magnitude 
because law is in units of standard deviations.  A one standard deviation improvement 
in Law thus increases wealth by 0.004 standard deviations in non-urban regions and 
0.067 standard deviations in urban regions at the means of all other variables.  Figure 
2 plots the marginal effect of Law as Trust Army varies from zero to one (it is a 
percentage), holding all other variables at their means.   
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Figure 2: Marginal Effect of Law with Trust Army 
It is clear in figure 2 that the effect of Law is stronger when Trust Army is 
higher for both urban and non-urban regions.  Since Trust Army serves as a proxy for 
trust in national government, this intuitive interaction suggests that improving the 
legal system will be more beneficial for wealth when people have greater trust in 
national government.  Another interesting result from figure two is that when trust is 
very low in non-urban regions the marginal effect of Law is negative, suggesting that 
having a stronger legal system imposes some costs on households.   
Figure 3 shows the marginal effect of Law as Crime varies, holding all other 
variables at their means.  This figure suggests that improving the legal system will 
have a stronger positive impact on wealth when fear of crime is higher.  It also shows 
that if fear of crime is very low in non-urban areas then efforts to improve the legal 
system could be detrimental to wealth.   
 
 
 
 
 50 
Marginal Effect of Law with Crime
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Crime
M
a
rg
in
a
l E
ff
e
ct
Non Urban Urban
 
Figure 3: Marginal Effect of Law with Crime 
 
Law thus has a clear positive effect in urban regions and a positive effect in 
non-urban regions when Crime and Trust Army are at or above their means.  These 
results suggest that improving the legal system will be beneficial when people fear 
crime and trust national government more, but may backfire when crime is not a 
problem and trust is low.   
It is surprising that the effect of Law on wealth is negative at any point.  Law 
may capture to some degree the perception that the government will be oppressive, 
particularly when trust in the national government and fear of crime are low so 
government meddling is seen as threatening and unnecessary.  It is plausible that 
African governments are prone to collect taxes in a heavy-handed fashion and higher 
expectations of law enforcement therefore mean lower expectations of freedom.  Thus 
improving the legal system is associated with greater government interference.  When 
people trust the government and fear crime this interference is beneficial, but if crime 
is not a problem and trust in the government is low government interference is 
detrimental to wealth in non-urban areas.   
 Hypothesis 3 says that living in a region with higher levels of trust will lead to 
greater wealth.  The evidence here is surprising.  The effect of Trust Army, which 
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reflects a general level of trust in national government (recall its high correlations with 
the other trust variables), is positive in non-urban regions but negative in urban 
regions at the means.  The marginal effect of Trust Local Reps is negative.  Given that 
both of these variables measure trust and that they are positively correlated (.64), it is 
surprising that they have the opposite sign.  The significance of these variables 
suggests that trust is indeed important, but the negative signs suggest that perceptions 
of trust perhaps capture naivety rather than a good institutional setting.  Alternatively, 
it is possible that higher trust in one’s local representative reflects a greater reliance on 
local leaders, perhaps because they are at odds with the national government.  
Unfortunately, I lack data to investigate this further.       
 Hypothesis 4 says that living in a region with higher levels of corruption 
decreases household wealth.  The evidence here is complex.  Both corruption variables 
are significant, but their signs differ.  In urban regions the marginal effect of Reps 
Corrupt is large and negative and the effect of Police Corrupt is larger and positive.  In 
non-urban regions the effect of Reps Corrupt is positive but small, while the effect of 
Police Corrupt is also positive but not as large as in urban regions.  
 Let’s focus first on urban regions.  Theoretically, corruption can decrease 
wealth if it merely reflects wasteful government (the ―cost effect‖), but it can increase 
wealth if it allows individuals to bypass unwieldy red tape (the ―grease effect‖) 
(Bardhan 1997, Paldam and Gundlach 2008).  It is possible that we are seeing both 
effects here.  The Reps Corrupt variable reflects the level of corruption in the 
government itself and in representatives whom individuals rarely come into contact 
with.  It is not surprising then that in urban areas this variable captures the negative 
effects of worse governance, and the estimated marginal effect is large.  A one 
standard deviation increase in Reps Corrupt is estimated to decrease wealth by 0.25 
standard deviations in urban regions.   
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The Police Corrupt variable, however, measures the level of corruption in an 
arm of government with which individuals can expect to have contact.  Thus if the 
government is heavy-handed and imposes strict regulations in urban areas, greater 
corruption among the police may indicate more possibilities for individuals to get 
around government rules.  Thus corruption among the police is good and living in 
urban areas where the police are more corrupt increases individual wealth by a large 
magnitude: a one standard deviation increase in Police Corrupt is estimated to increase 
wealth by 0.3 standard deviations in urban areas.  This line of thought is supported 
further by the negative interaction of Police Corrupt with Trust Local Rep shown in 
figure 4.  This figure shows that when the level of trust of the local representative is 
low, the benefit of police corruption is larger.  
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Figure 4: Marginal Effect of Police Corrupt with Trust Local Rep. 
 In non-urban regions the story is less clear.  The effect of Reps Corrupt is 
small but positive here, perhaps because in places where the government is less 
present, this variable captures people’s awareness of how government works.  Thus 
the positive effect is due to greater awareness of the workings of government, and the 
deleterious effects of increased corruption in representatives are felt less in non-urban 
regions.  Police Corrupt has a smaller positive effect in non-urban regions, so there are 
no negative effects of corruption at the means in non urban regions.  
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 The multiple effects of corruption at different levels of government and the 
stark differences in urban versus non urban regions are an important result.  Measures 
of corruption in the literature often come from surveys of businessmen who do 
business in the country.  It is likely that these surveys have an urban bias because 
international business will naturally be focused in urban areas.  Using these measures 
for the whole country then distorts the different effects of corruption in urban and non 
urban regions.  The results here indicate that there are no negative effects of corruption 
in non urban regions, and that the ―grease effect‖ may be slightly larger than the ―cost 
effect‖ in urban regions (Paldam and Gundlach 2008).  Policies aimed at reducing 
corruption may therefore have little or no benefit to household wealth.  
VI. Conclusion 
 There are several interesting results from this analysis.  The broad results are 
that the effects of institutions are non-linear and that within-country variation is 
important.  Furthermore, the urban/non-urban and local/national dichotomies, as well 
as the different effects of corruption at different levels of government could not be 
captured by a single country-level variable.  These results suggest that the country-
level literature ignores important variation within countries and also may be 
underspecified because it cannot account for the nonlinear effects of institutions.  
The specific results are that living in regions with greater fear of crime 
decreases household wealth and that living in urban regions where legal systems are 
better increases wealth.  The positive interactions between the legal system and fear of 
crime and the legal system and trust are intuitive and interesting.  These interactions 
suggest first that policies to improve the legal system will be better targeted at areas 
where fear of crime is higher but also where trust of national government is higher.  
The interactions also show that it is naïve to expect any of these variables to have an 
independent direct effect on wealth.   
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The first surprising result is the negative effect of improving the legal system 
when crime and trust in national government are at or below their means in non-urban 
regions, suggesting that higher expectations of laws being enforced can also mean a 
more oppressive government that imposes other costs and constraints on wealth.   
The second surprising result is that there seem to be good and bad kinds of 
corruption, particularly in urban regions.  Corruption in representatives, which proxies 
for the general level of corruption in the government, is detrimental to wealth in urban 
regions.  However, corruption among the police has a positive effect on wealth in 
urban regions, suggesting that corruption at lower levels where people interact with 
the government may allow for more flexibility to bypass oppressive policies.   
 These results as a whole suggest that the workings of institutions are complex 
and that policies based on country-level data may be misguided.  For example, the 
existence of positive effects of increased corruption, particularly among the police in 
urban areas, suggests that policy initiatives aimed at curtailing corruption of all types 
may fail to increase wealth.  Policy makers need to be aware that there may be strong 
urban/non-urban and local/national dichotomies in institutional functioning in African 
countries.  Policy initiatives will thus be better targeted where there is a clear effect, 
such as in reducing the fear of crime or improving legal systems in high-crime urban 
areas rather than attempting to weed out general corruption or promote democracy.   
Finally, these results indicate that further research is needed.  Dynamic effects 
of political institutions may be important but are not analyzed here.  Future research 
will hopefully have panel data to investigate dynamic problems and will also develop 
clearer measures of regional institutions to further our understanding of the role these 
institutions play in growth and development.   
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Chapter 3 
Are Institutions Fundamental for Development?  
Evidence From Madagascar
18
 
 
 
                                                 
18
 This chapter was co-written with Christine Moser, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of 
Economics, Western Michigan University.  
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 The literature on institutions and economic growth has shown that institutions 
are one of, if not the, primary factors in explaining cross-country differences in long-
term development (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005, Paldam and Gundlach 2008, Pande 
and Udry 2005).  However, the cross-country literature cannot ―unbundle‖ institutions 
to illuminate the mechanisms driving these results and does not consider within 
country variation in institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson 20005).  It is thus unclear if 
the results are driven narrowly by property rights institutions or broadly by many 
factors correlated with institutions.  We analyze institutions and the development of 
the manufacturing sector at a very low administrative level in Madagascar, and we 
find that institutions are the key drivers of development of the manufacturing sector 
and the level of infrastructure.  We see a strong narrow effect of formal land titles and 
find that institutions do vary in significant ways within Madagascar.   
   We use data from a countrywide commune census in Madagascar.  
Communes are the lowest administrative level in Madagascar, akin to counties in the 
U.S., and our census is a spatially explicit panel.  We therefore have a larger sample 
and greater statistical controls than cross-country regressions.  Specifically, we test 
and control for bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, spatial bias and autocorrelation 
and endogeneity.  We find that endogeneity is by far the largest source of bias.  When 
we account for the endogeneity of both institutions and infrastructure to development 
of the manufacturing sector, we find that land titling is the primary driver of both 
manufacturing and infrastructure.  We interpret land titling as a proxy for a broader 
institutional environment, which we argue is fundamentally important for economic 
development.  
II. Background  
 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) claim that there is a ―growing consensus among 
economists and political scientists‖ that institutions are ―a primary determinant of 
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economic performance.‖ (p. 950)  This consensus comes from cross-country evidence 
that institutions have an important causal effect on long-term development (Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson 2001, Rigobon and Rodrik 2005, Sokoloff and Engerman 
2000) and that the effect of institutions is stronger than the effects of geography and 
trade integration (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 2004).   
 The cross country literature opens up many interesting questions.  What are 
institutions, exactly, and how do they impact growth in such a significant way?  While 
the literature has progressed steadily on developing robust cross country regressions, 
the mechanisms driving these empirical results are not discussed in great detail.  The 
most common argument about how institutions drive economic growth is that property 
rights institutions protect investment, leading to better returns and lower risks for 
households and firms, an argument put forth by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001) in their seminal paper.  
The only further delineation of specific institutions in the cross country 
literature comes from Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who make a broad distinction 
between property rights institutions and contracting institutions and show that property 
rights institutions are more important for long-term growth.  However, Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) also stress that property rights variables at the country level represent 
a ―bundle‖ of institutions whose individual effects cannot be distinguished.   
At the country level, property rights institutions are measured by things such as 
the probability of expropriation by the government or constraints on the executive.  
The theoretical justification for these measures is the relatively simple idea that 
individuals and firms have greater incentives to invest when their property is less 
likely to be expropriated.  Thus better property rights institutions are theorized to lead 
directly to better returns on investment.  
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 This simple explanation belies the large explanatory power of institutions in 
cross-country regressions.  We must consider that property rights may be capturing a 
broader institutional setting that is conducive to growth.  Green (2008), for example, 
shows that regional (within country) variation in subjective security, law enforcement 
and corruption explains differences in household wealth in a sample of thirteen 
African countries.  Green (2008) uses within-country variation in institutions and a 
multilevel identification strategy to test the effects of several institutions at once, 
which cannot be done in cross-country regressions.  The limited number of 
instrumental variables available at the country level is one reason why the mechanisms 
of institutions have not been explored more thoroughly.  Thus, while the cross-country 
literature has opened up many questions, we may need to turn to within-country data 
to answer them (Pande and Udry, 2005, Green 2008).  
 Micro and meso level research on institutions investigates property rights as 
well, albeit with different measurements.  De Soto (2000) is famous for arguing for 
property rights at the household level in the form of formal land titles.  He makes a 
similar theoretical argument to the one in the macro literature: better property rights 
allow for better returns on investment.  Jacoby and Minten (2007) test this hypothesis 
directly in Madagascar by analyzing the investment decisions of households with and 
without formal titles on their land.  However, they find no direct effect of owning a 
title on household investment.  It is not clear then how differences in land titling at the 
micro level are related to the cross-country results.   
Fafchamps and Moser (2003) as well as Fafchamps and Minten (2001) point 
out another aspect of property rights - the negative effect of crime on trade.  Crime is 
costly not always through measurable theft, but through the costly adjustments made 
by individuals to avoid theft.  Thus property needs to be protected from other 
individuals as well as from the government.  This aspect of property rights is captured 
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by Green’s (2008) measure of ―fear of crime,‖ which he finds is a significant 
determinant of household-level wealth.  We can thus delineate two aspects of property 
rights at the micro level.  The first is formal rights in the form of land titles and the 
second is informal protection from others in the form of subjective security.  
Other research argues for the importance of infrastructure for growth.  
Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa (2006) argue that infrastructure is systematically 
under-provided in African countries.  Moser, Barrett and Minten (2005) explore how 
transactions costs due to poor infrastructure in Madagascar lead to poor price 
transmission and low market integration, and Kimenyi (2006) argues that public goods 
such as roads and schools have in many cases in Africa been distributed along ethnic 
lines.  Moser (2008a) also finds evidence that public goods allocation is influenced by 
patronage and reelection concerns in Madagascar.  Bates and Humphreys (2005) 
model provision of public goods by an elected government and argue that electoral 
accountability is key for public good provision in Africa.  We must therefore consider 
the effects of infrastructure on economic development and consider the relationship 
between institutions and infrastructure.  It seems reasonable to expect better 
institutions to correlate positively with better infrastructure, so it is possible that part 
of the country level effect of institutions is due to the positive effect of infrastructure.  
In sum, we have a macro level literature that suggests that institutions are very 
important for development and ascribes their effects to a vague conceptualization of 
property rights.  However, the small number of reasonable instruments for institutions 
at the country level severely limits further empirical investigation across countries.  
Micro and meso level work also suggests that property rights may be important, but 
considers subjective security, infrastructure and other institutions like corruption and 
trust as well.  It is not clear then if the cross country results are driven by a narrow 
effect of property rights, as suggested by the macro literature, or by a broader 
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institutional setting that affects formal and informal property rights, infrastructure and 
other factors as well.   The literature also cannot tell us if the effects of property rights 
in cross-country regressions should be present in within country regressions because 
the micro literature has mixed results on property rights alone.   
In this paper, we ask the question: do institutions matter for economic 
development at a very low administrative level within a single country?  We find that 
they do, and we further examine which institutions matter and the relationship 
between institutions and infrastructure in Madagascar.  We find that formal property 
rights in the form of land titling are the key driver of employment in manufacturing 
and of the level of infrastructure.  While our main effect is on the formal property 
rights variable, our entire results suggest that this variable may be a proxy for a better 
institutional environment.  The next section describes the data.  Section IV discusses 
estimation and Section V presents our results.  Section VI concludes.   
III. Data 
 This paper uses two rounds of a unique commune census from Madagascar.  
Communes are the lowest administrative unit in Madagascar, akin to counties in the 
United States.  The first census was conducted in 2001 and the second in 2007.  There 
were 1391 communes in 2001, but a new administrative structure split some large 
communes into parts so there were 1549 communes in 2007.  Fortunately, we do have 
data on which communes were split so the periods can be matched.  For this analysis, 
the 2001 communes are the base unit of analysis and the 2007 data was collapsed to 
the 2001 communes.  In both periods, some communes could not be surveyed due to 
insecurity, so our base sample for both periods is 1375 communes.   
 Madagascar is divided into six provinces, 22 regions and 110 districts 
(fivondrana).  In 2001, the regions existed in name but had no de facto administrative 
role (Moser 2008b).  This situation changed with the new administrative structure put 
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in place in 2004, which emphasized regional government and shifted many 
administrative roles away from the provinces.  Communes and fivondrana have been 
consistently present, but there have been some shifts in their administrative 
responsibilities as well (Moser 2008b).  It is a strength of the data that we will be able 
to do analysis at different administrative levels; however, we must consider that 
communes, fivondrana, regions and provinces have different administrative roles in 
each period, which may lead to some differences in the estimations in each period or 
in a pooled sample.   
 The census collected detailed data on commune infrastructure, businesses, 
legal systems and agriculture from focus groups and administrative records in each 
commune.  The focus groups were made up of residents from the commune, some of 
whom were randomly chosen and some of whom had administrative positions in the 
commune.  While enumerators were instructed to interview a diverse group that would 
represent the whole commune as closely as possible, the data are not strictly 
representative of the communes, particularly their more remote villages.  Some of the 
questions are subjective, which may introduce further noise.  Thus there are some 
weaknesses to the data.  However, to our knowledge the data is unique in being a 
panel countrywide census covering a wide range of variables at a low administrative 
level.   
 Our dependent variable is a proxy for the level of economic development 
(income data is not available at the commune level).  The commune census asks 
whether small (<10 employees), medium (11-50 employees) or large (>50 employees) 
manufacturing / agri-business firms are present in the commune.  When a firm is 
present, the census asks for an estimate of the number of employees.  We combine the 
estimates of the number of employees of the first small, medium and large firms in 
each commune to form our outcome variable, Employment.  Employment gives us a 
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continuous proxy for economic development.  Unfortunately, the census does not 
record the number of employees for large firms if it exceeds 100.  The Employment 
variable is therefore right-censored at 160 (10 for a small firm plus 50 for medium and 
100 for large).   
 We are interested in policy initiatives for long term growth.  To that end, we 
use variables measuring institutions, physical infrastructure and market infrastructure 
from the census.  We will also make use of some geographic variables as exogenous 
controls.  We first describe the institutional variables.  
 We distinguish here between two aspects of property rights: protection from 
other individuals, reflected in the crime / security situation, and protection from the 
government (local or national), reflected in formal legal rights. The commune census 
has variables that measure both of these aspects of property rights.   
The first institutional variable, Security, is an indicator equal to one if the focus 
group rated the security situation as good or very good.  This variable captures the 
group’s subjective expectations about security, which we feel map well onto the 
degree to which they must make costly adjustments due to insecurity.  There are 
objective indicators of security in the census (crime data, police presence, etc.), but we 
feel that the subjective indicator better captures people’s expectations about security, 
which influence their economic decisions.
19
   
 The second institutional variable relates to land titling.  The census asks the 
focus group to estimate the percentage of land in the commune that is titled, which 
indicates land that has a transferable title in the owner’s name.   The responses are 
categorical—from one to six—where one indicates zero percent, two indicates 1 – 5 
percent, etc.  Our variable Titled was computed from this data by counting the median 
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 We compared results using the objective indicators as well and they were not 
significantly different.  See Appendix 5 for a summary of results with objective 
measures of crime.  
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value in the range for each number (so a number 1 was counted as 0 percent, number 2 
as 3 percent, etc.).  This variable is an admittedly noisy measure of land titling, but it 
does have the benefit of having a clear interpretation.
20
  We thus have two measures of 
property rights institutions: Security and Titled.   
The commune census also contains good data on the infrastructure in each 
commune.  We divide these variables into physical infrastructure and market 
infrastructure.  The physical infrastructure variables include the number of service 
stations in a commune and indicators for whether a commune has a paved road, an 
unpaved road, national electricity, cell phone service, landline phone service, 
community wells or public running water.  The market infrastructure variables include 
the number of daily and seasonal markets operating in a commune and an indicator for 
whether formal credit is available in agriculture.   
 Lastly, we make use of geographic variables as exogenous controls.  These 
include indicators for whether a commune borders the ocean, has a river, has a 
navigable river or has a forest.  We also use a distance variable, DistanceUC, that 
measures the distance in kilometers to the nearest urban center, and Population, which 
is an estimate of the commune’s population.  Since population changes are likely 
endogenous to Employment, we use a two year lag of population.  Table 5 presents the 
summary statistics of the commune variables.  
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 We also tried using indicators for each range of percentages and obtained very 
similar results.  
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Table 5: Summary Statistics  
 Mean  Std. Dev Min Max 
Employment 11.24 30.10 0 160 
Institutional Variables     
 Titled (%) 0.06 0.13 0 0.75 
 Security Indicator 0.73 0.44 0 1 
Physical Infrastructure     
 Paved Road 0.23 0.42 0 1 
 Unpaved Road 0.68 0.47 0 1 
 National Electricity 0.09 0.28 0 1 
 Landline  0.15 0.36 0 1 
 Cellphone 0.26 0.44 0 1 
 Community Wells 0.20 0.40 0 1 
 Running Water 0.12 0.33 0 1 
 Number of Service Stations 0.15 0.79 0 25 
Market Infrastructure     
 Number of Daily Markets 0.90 3.21 0 29 
 Number of Seasonal Markets 0.97 3.24 0 42 
 Formal Credit in Agriculture 0.23 0.42 0 1 
  
We are interested in the effects of institutions and infrastructure on the 
development of the manufacturing sector.  However, we first need to determine what 
the appropriate administrative level is for our analysis.  For example, it is possible that 
road building is a district responsibility and therefore there is a wide disparity in roads 
between districts and little or no disparity in roads between regions.  In terms of 
institutions, the implicit assumption of most quantitative research is that variation 
within countries does not matter, much less variation at the commune level.  To shed 
some light on this question, we decompose the variance of seven key variables into the 
between commune, between district, between region and between province variation.  
Table 6 presents the decomposition.
21
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 Appendix 6 describes the decomposition of the variance in detail.   
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Table 6: Variance Decompositions 
Variable Between 
Commune 
Variance 
Between 
District 
Variance 
Between 
Region 
Variance 
Between 
Province 
Variance 
Employment 83% 12% 2% 3% 
Titled 84% 11% 3% 1% 
Security 86% 11% 5% 2% 
Paved Road 88% 9% 2% 2% 
Landline 72% 11% 5% 12% 
Running Water 63% 20% 5% 12% 
Number of Daily Markets 73% 21% 4% 3% 
 
It is clear from the variance decomposition that most of the variance of all of 
our key variables is at the commune level.  We will therefore focus our efforts on 
commune level regressions.  We now turn to the estimation.  
IV. Estimation Strategy 
 We want to estimate the effects of institutions, physical infrastructure and 
market infrastructure on the development of the manufacturing sector, which is 
measured here by the Employment variable.  Our basic model is  
yit = β1*Institutions + β2*Phys. Infra. + β3*Market Infra. + uit (1) 
The parameters of interest are the vectors β1, β2 and β3.  There are several 
potential problems that could bias least squares estimates of these coefficients and / or 
distort inference from our results.  We need to account for potential bias due to 
unobserved time-invariant commune characteristics (i.e. fixed effects), endogeneity of 
both institutions and infrastructure, omission of spatial lags and censoring.  We also 
need to correct our standard errors for the panel structure and spatial autocorrelation.   
The first problem we will consider is unobserved commune heterogeneity.  
There may be unobserved, time-invariant characteristics of individual communes that 
correlate with the variables in the model and therefore bias estimates of the 
coefficients.  Formally, this is the case if 
uit = ci + εit (2) 
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where ci represents unobserved, time-invariant commune characteristics and εit 
is a mean zero stochastic error term.  If ci is correlated with any of the independent 
variables, estimates of β are biased.  We will test for bias due to unobserved 
heterogeneity by comparing the estimates of β from the within estimator, which is 
equation (1) with fixed effects for each commune added in, with the between 
estimator, which is the regression using the commune means over time.  If ci is 
orthogonal to the independent variables, the estimated coefficients from the between 
and within estimations will be the same.  
The second potential source of bias is endogeneity of both institutions and 
infrastructure.  Endogeneity is the most common and most difficult problem in 
analysis of the effects of institutions on development.  There are two ways to think 
about the endogeneity problem.  The first is that there is some underlying process, like 
the choices of governments, that affects both the dependent and potentially 
independent variables.  Because this process affects the dependent variable, it is in the 
error term.  Because it affects the independent variables, the errors are then correlated 
with them and least squares estimates are biased.   
 The second way to think about endogeneity is reverse causality.  For example, 
this would be the case if firms in communes lobbied successfully for better 
infrastructure, resulting in a high correlation in the data between infrastructure and 
Employment but no actual causation.  Formally, this is to say that our X variable is 
really a Y and vice versa, and the end result is again biased estimates.   
We account for the problem of endogeneity in several ways.  The commune 
census includes some historical variables that can be used as instruments for 
institutions.  The census recorded whether the French were present in a commune, 
whether the French had administrative facilities in a commune and whether other 
foreigners were present in a commune during the colonial period.  Madagascar was 
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formally under French control from 1894 until 1960.  It is reasonable to expect that 
communes where the French or other foreigners were present in the colonial period 
would develop more formal systems of property rights / land ownership to manage the 
competing claims of indigenous and foreign land users.  We thus expect these 
variables to correlate positively with our measures of property rights, the Titled and 
Security variables.  These colonial variables are valid instruments under the exclusion 
restriction that they do not have a direct effect on development of the manufacturing 
sector in the present, which seems realistic.  Thus we account for the endogeneity of 
institutions with instrumental variables.  
We also need to account for the endogeneity of infrastructure.  We can 
instrument for some of the infrastructure variables with some geographic variables.  
Specifically, we have data on commune elevation and precipitation as well as the 
previously mentioned variables for the distance to an urban center and whether a 
commune borders the ocean.  We can use these to instrument for cell phone service, 
public running water, the number of service stations and the number of daily markets.  
The necessary exclusion restriction is that these geographic variables must affect 
development of the manufacturing sector only through their affects on the 
aforementioned infrastructure variables.  This exclusion restriction is questionable 
because there are other plausible pathways through which geography could affect 
manufacturing, which could lead to an overestimation of the effects of infrastructure 
when using these instruments.   
Since the exclusion restriction for infrastructure instruments is weak we 
consider two other ways to account for the endogeneity of infrastructure.  First we use 
a subsample of communes, those communes in 2007 that had no manufacturing firms 
in 2001.  Since these communes had no manufacturing employment in 2001, it is 
unlikely that manufacturing firms there successfully lobbied for better infrastructure.  
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Using this subsample thus eliminates bias due to reverse causality.  However, 
estimates of (1) may still be biased if there is an underlying process that affects both 
infrastructure and employment in manufacturing.  We test for this second potential 
bias by again using Employment in 2007 in communes that had no employment in 
manufacturing in 2001, but regressing this 2007 Employment on the 2001 independent 
variables.  If there is an underlying process that affects both Employment and 
infrastructure, then these estimates will be different from those in the same period.  If 
infrastructure exogenously causes Employment, then we should still see an effect of 
infrastructure here, although it may be weaker due to the time lag.  These subsample 
regressions give us two other ways to check the potential endogeneity of infrastructure 
since we lack strong instruments for the infrastructure variables.  
To summarize, we account for the endogeneity of institutions by instrumenting 
for them with colonial history variables under a reasonable exclusion restriction.  We 
account for the endogeneity of infrastructure in three ways.  First, we instrument with 
geographical variables, although the exclusion restriction is admittedly weak.  Second, 
we regress new Employment in 2007 on institutions and infrastructure to avoid reverse 
causality.  Third, we regress new Employment in 2007 on institutions and 
infrastructure in 2001 to see if infrastructure and Employment arise 
contemporaneously or if infrastructure in the past causes new Employment in the 
present.   
The third potential source of bias in least squares estimates of equation (1) is 
spatial bias.  Since our units of analysis are contiguous communes, it is possible that 
outcomes in one commune may be affected by both outcomes and independent 
variables in neighboring communes.  Formally, the spatial model is: 
yit = α1yits + β1*Inst. + β2*Phys.Inf. + β3*Mar.Inf. + α2*Inst.s +  
        α3*Phys.Inf.s + α4*Mar.Inf.s + uit (3) 
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where the s subscript indicates a spatial lag, which is a weighted average of the 
values of that variable for neighboring communes.  If (3) is the correct model (i.e. if 
the α’s are not zero) then estimates of (1) may be biased due to the omission of spatial 
lags.  The commune census identifies up to eight contiguous neighbors to each 
commune, allowing for the creation of spatial variables that equally weigh all 
contiguous communes.  We can then estimate (3).  We are interested in whether the 
α’s are significant and in whether the β’s differ from other specifications.  
Unfortunately, adding in spatial lags of endogenous variables may exacerbate bias due 
to endogeneity.  Thus if the β’s from (3) are significantly different from (1), we cannot 
identify whether the difference is due to spatial bias or to exacerbated endogeneity.   
The last source of potential bias is the easiest to correct for.  Since our 
dependent variable, Employment, is right censored, we use a Tobit estimator to 
account for bias due to censoring.   
There are also some potential problems with inference.  Specifically, the panel 
model of errors in (2) and the spatial model both suggest structure on the residuals that 
affects the calculation of standard errors.  We thus consider corrections to the standard 
errors that account for the panel structure and for spatial autocorrelation.  We run a 
random effects model that accounts for the structure in (2).  The residuals in a spatial 
autocorrelation model have the following structure: 
uit = λWuits + εit (4) 
where λ is the coefficient representing the strength of the autocorrelation and 
W is a weighting matrix that assigns weights based on some measure of distance.  We 
equally weigh all contiguous communes to each commune in the survey and give all 
other communes a weight of zero.  We then estimate λ using minimum distance on the 
residuals and correct the standard errors.   
V.  Results 
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 We first test for bias due to unobserved heterogeneity in equation (1).  The test 
statistic comes from the comparison of the coefficients of the within and between 
estimators.  The null hypothesis is that they are the same.  We initially find chi
2 
(17) = 
23.07.  The probability we would see a number this high under the null is 0.15, 
suggesting that there may be some bias.  Upon closer examination, we find that 
several of the coefficients that differ greatly in the two estimations are highly 
insignificant in both, suggesting that we may just be seeing noise rather than strong 
bias.  We therefore drop four insignificant variables and again test for bias due to 
unobserved heterogeneity.  We now find chi
2
 (13) = 14.51, which we would see under 
the null with probability 0.34.  We conclude that some of the bias was simply noise 
and that there does not seem to be any strong bias due to unobserved heterogeneity.   
 Further examination of the within and between regressions shows that only 
three variables are really different with fixed effects.
22
  Unpaved Road is negative and 
insignificant without fixed effects but positive and marginally significant with them.  
Number of Service Stations is positive and significant with or without fixed effects, 
but its coefficient doubles in magnitude with fixed effects, and the Number of Daily 
Markets is significant without fixed effects but insignificant with them.  All other 
variables have nearly identical coefficients in the two regressions, suggesting that bias 
due to unobserved heterogeneity is small and is consigned to the three aforementioned 
variables.  We thus conclude that commune fixed effects are not necessary.  
 We next consider potential bias due to endogeneity.  We use instrumental 
variables; however, there is a question of what the appropriate sample is.  Since we 
have shown that commune fixed effects are unimportant, we prefer to use the pooled 
sample from both periods because it is the largest.  We are therefore treating the data 
                                                 
22
 See Appendix 7 for the results of the between and within estimations 
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as if we have 2750 individual communes rather than 1375 in two periods.
23
  Using this 
pooled sample is only appropriate because commune fixed effects do not significantly 
bias the results.   
Table 7 presents 5 regressions, all of which are variations of a random effects 
Tobit estimator on Employment.  The first does not account for endogeneity of 
institutions or infrastructure in any way.  It indicates strong associations between 
physical and market infrastructure and employment.  Almost all of the infrastructure 
variables are strongly significant in it.  It also indicates a significant positive 
association between formal land titling and employment.  This first regression 
confirms that the things we are interested in understanding: employment, institutions 
and infrastructure, are closely related.  The next four specifications attempt to sort out 
the causal relationships.  
 The second regression instruments for the two institutional variables, Titled 
and Security, in the pooled sample.  It does not account for the possible endogeneity of 
infrastructure.  The results here are informative.  We find that Titled now has a much 
larger, nonlinear effect while many of the infrastructure variables are no longer 
significant and/or have smaller coefficients.  These results indicate that institutions, 
specifically land titling, have a significant causal effect on Employment.  The changes 
in the infrastructure variables from the first regression to the second suggest that many 
of the infrastructure variables are related to institutions as well and therefore the strong 
associations in the first regression were actually capturing part of the causal effect of 
institutions.   
                                                 
23
 We have also estimated the IV equations in the 2001, 2007 and between samples 
and the results are robust to the choice of sample.  If anything, the effects of 
institutions are stronger in the smaller samples.   
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   Table 7: Regression Results 
Dependent Variable: 
Employment 
Tobit: No 
Instrument
s 
IV Tobit 
(instruments 
for 
institutions) 
IV Tobit 
(instruments 
for 
institutions) 
IV Tobit 
(instruments 
for 
institutions) 
IV Tobit 
(instruments 
for institutions 
and 
infrastructure) 
 Sample Pooled 
Sample 
Pooled 
Sample 
2007 
communes 
with no 
manufacturi
ng 
employment 
in 2001 
2007 
Employment, 
2001  
variables, 
communes 
with no 
Employment 
in 2001 
Pooled 
Sample 
Institutional Variables      
 Titled  43.53*** 
(11.96) 
-3.39 
(60.75) 
-151.78 
(102.81) 
72.73 
(118.44) 
190.57* 
(105.92) 
 Titled Squared -13.00 
(17.09) 
999.43*** 
(149.54) 
1822.155*** 
(330.60) 
-7.34 
(313.15) 
 
 Security 0.08 (1.11) 10.26 
(20.88) 
-78.22** 
(35.08) 
-40.67 
(40.02) 
30.32  
(25.15) 
Physical Infrastructure      
 Paved Road 8.16*** 
(1.18) 
6.23*** 
(1.79) 
6.45** 
(3.09) 
-0.83  
(3.28) 
 
 Unpaved Road -0.80 
(1.08) 
-0.67  
(1.37) 
7.21** 
(3.14) 
1.54 
 (2.28) 
 
 National Electricity 11.78*** 
(1.90) 
-0.37  
(4.54) 
0.07  
(7.70) 
-0.46 
 (8.88) 
 
 Landline Phone Serv. 12.64*** 
(1.75) 
8.33*** 
(2.79) 
5.67 
 (4.43) 
1.98 
 (6.73) 
 
 Cell Phone Service 3.21** 
(1.54) 
3.05*  
(1.57) 
4.83** 
(2.11) 
-1.05 
 (7.84) 
-7.73 
 (28.62) 
 Community Wells 4.58*** 
(1.26) 
3.14 
 (2.00) 
3.18 
 (4.00) 
-2.96 
 (3.41) 
 
 Public Running Water 14.36*** 
(2.12) 
9.06*** 
(2.94) 
9.62** 
(4.28) 
 9.74 
 (22.92) 
 Number of Serv. Stat. 6.26*** 
(1.14) 
4.96*** 
(1.19) 
7.59*** 
(1.73) 
-4.33 
 (4.56) 
-6.45 
 (21.85) 
 Number of Serv. Stat.
2
 -0.23*** 
(0.07) 
-0.18*** 
(0.07) 
-0.28*** 
(0.08) 
0.45  
(1.34) 
 
Market Infrastructure      
 Number of Daily Mark. 2.42*** 
(0.63) 
1.71** 
(0.75) 
0.07 
 (1.10) 
2.55  
(2.03) 
6.09 
 (5.48) 
 Number of Daily Mark.
2
 -0.07*** 
(0.03) 
-0.04  
(0.03) 
0.02 
 (0.05) 
-0.26 
 (0.23) 
 
 Number of Seas. Mark. -0.60 
(0.38) 
-0.74*  
(0.42) 
-0.19  
(0.83) 
0.39 
 (0.96) 
 
 Number of Seas. Mark.
2
 0.03** 
(0.17) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
 (0.03) 
-0.07 
 (0.07) 
 
 Formal Credit in Ag. 0.18  
(1.36) 
0.97  
(1.52) 
4.76** 
(2.32) 
11.61*** 
(2.63) 
18.18* 
 (10.65) 
Observations 2740 2708 1066 1066 2332 
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 The first two specifications indicate that institutions are indeed endogenous.  
They further suggest that institutions are closely related to infrastructure, which may 
drive some of the strong associations in the first regression.  We now need to account 
for the possible endogeneity of infrastructure.  As previously discussed, the bias due to 
endogeneity could potentially take two forms.  The first is reverse causality, where 
employment actually causes infrastructure.  We account for bias due to reverse 
causality by restricting our sample to communes in 2007 that had no manufacturing 
employment in 2001.  In this sample, all of the positive values of Employment reflect 
new employment since 2001.  It is very unlikely that new firms since 2001 could 
cause infrastructure by 2007, so this sample should avoid bias due to reverse causality. 
 The third column in Table 7 presents these results.  This regression instruments 
for institutions in the same way as the second, and the results here are very similar to 
the second regression.  We find a large positive (albeit nonlinear) effect of land titling 
and some positive effects of infrastructure, specifically cell phone service and the 
number of service stations.  Two variables that were previously insignificant are 
significant in this specification: Unpaved Road and Formal Credit in Agriculture.  This 
specification indicates that there is not much bias due to reverse causality.  It also 
indicates that Formal Credit in Agriculture may be important for the development of 
new employment in manufacturing.  
 The second source of potential bias due to endogeneity is the presence of an 
unobserved variable, presumably representing the choice process of local government, 
that affects both Employment and infrastructure.  Our third regression indicated that 
Employment does not seem to be causing infrastructure.  However, it is possible that 
both Employment and infrastructure are caused by the government’s choice process, 
which is unobserved.  The implication is that both infrastructure and Employment 
would develop contemporaneously due to the choices of the local government, with 
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neither causing the other.  We therefore want to test if infrastructure causes 
Employment or if an unobserved process seems to cause them both.   
 We first consider again the subsample of communes that did not have any 
employment in manufacturing in 2001, as we did in the third regression in Table 7.  
However, we now regress the 2007 employment data from this subsample on 2001 
institution and infrastructure data.  This regression gives us an indication of whether 
infrastructure causes Employment in the long-term or whether new employment and 
infrastructure develop contemporaneously.  We find that only one infrastructure 
variable is significant: Formal Credit in Agriculture.  All of the other infrastructure 
variables are insignificant and many of them change signs from previous 
specifications.  Our institutional variables are insignificant here as well, but the sign 
and magnitude of the linear coefficient on Titled are consistent with other 
specifications.  These results are consistent with the explanation that infrastructure and 
Employment develop contemporaneously, with neither causing the other.  
 Our results thus far suggest that infrastructure is endogenous and may have no 
causal effect on Employment.  We test this again by instrumenting for some 
infrastructure variables.  We instrument for Formal Credit in Agriculture with the 
same instruments we used for institutions, namely the presence or administrative 
capacity of the French or the presence of other foreigners during the colonial period.  
It stands to reason that communes where foreigners were present during the colonial 
period would develop more formal systems of credit.  We feel that these instruments 
are reasonable for Formal Credit in Agriculture.
24
   
We next instrument for four of the infrastructure variables that were significant 
in earlier specifications: Cell Phone, Public Running Water, Number of Service 
Stations and Number of Daily Markets.  We use geographical variables as instruments: 
                                                 
24
 See Appendix 8 for first-stage results 
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whether or not a commune borders the ocean, the distance in kilometers to the nearest 
urban center, maximum elevation in the commune and mean precipitation in the 
commune.  These instruments are admittedly not as strong as the historical variables 
for institutions.  The weak exclusion restriction suggests that we may see positive 
effects from the instruments that are actually due to a direct link between the 
instruments and Employment.   
The last column of table 7 presents these results.  We find again that the only 
infrastructure variable that is significant is Formal Credit in Agriculture.  These results 
are consistent with the results and explanation from the fourth regression, namely that 
infrastructure does not seem to have a causal effect on Employment.  However, we do 
see a large significant effect from Titled here, suggesting that institutions do cause 
Employment.  Thus, even under a weak exclusion restriction we see only one 
significant effect of infrastructure on Employment.  
The regressions in table 7 suggest that both institutions and infrastructure are 
endogenous to Employment, and further that institutions cause employment while 
infrastructure does not.  However, none of the regressions in table 7 account for spatial 
bias in the data.  We next must consider whether spatial lags are appropriate in any 
specification and if their presence changes our assessment of the endogeneity.  To test 
for spatial bias we introduce spatial lags of Employment and all of the dependent 
variables in each specification in table 7.  We find that the spatial lags of all of the 
independent variables are insignificant and do not affect the coefficients of other 
variables in any meaningful way.  The spatial lag of Employment, however, is positive 
and significant in most specifications, although it also has little effect on other 
coefficients.  We conclude that there does not appear to be any large spatial bias and 
that our conclusions about the endogeneity of institutions and infrastructure are robust 
to spatial bias.   
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We now present our final regressions on employment in table 8.  These 
regressions drop all of the infrastructure variables except for formal credit in 
agriculture, which we instrument for along with Titled and Security.  The first 
specification does not include the spatial lag of Employment; the second does.  We 
also drop the squared Titled variable as it is clearly insignificant in both regressions 
here.  We find that both Titled and Formal Credit in Agriculture have significant 
positive effects on employment.  These effects are tempered somewhat when we 
include the spatial lag of Employment, indicating a small degree of spatial bias.
25
  The 
positive coefficient on the spatial lag indicates positive spillovers from Employment in 
neighboring communes.  
 
Table 8:  Final Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Employment IV Tobit IV Tobit 
Titled 236.29*** (49.17) 182.26*** (46.48) 
Security -27.48 (19.40) -2.21 (18.36) 
Formal Credit in Agriculture 31.74*** (9.20) 18.27** (8.71) 
Spatial Lag of Employment  0.50*** (0.03) 
Observations 2708 2706 
Controls Geographic Variables, 
District Dummies 
Geographic Variables, 
District Dummies 
  
Our results indicate that both institutions and infrastructure are endogenous to 
Employment.  Specifically, the evidence here is consistent with the explanation that 
there is an underlying process that affects both infrastructure and Employment, and 
that this process is related to property rights institutions.  To explore this further, we 
regress the infrastructure variables, with the exception of Formal Credit in Agriculture, 
                                                 
25
 Our test of spatial autocorrelation, described in part IV, indicates that it is not a 
problem for inference.  In general, the standard errors we corrected for spatial 
autocorrelation are slightly smaller than the uncorrected ones.  We also correct for 
possible panel structure of the errors with random effects, again without changing the 
significance of any variables of interest.   
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on our institutional variables, Formal Credit in Agriculture and the exogenous 
controls.  We instrument for the institutional variables and Formal Credit in 
Agriculture.  Table 9 presents the results.  We find that Titled has a significant positive 
effect on six out of the nine infrastructure variables, suggesting that property rights 
institutions have a causal role in infrastructure.     
 This paper initially asked if institutions matter for development at low 
administrative levels.  The answer in Madagascar is a resounding yes.  Our results 
suggest that formal property rights play a causal role in both the development of 
manufacturing and in the level of infrastructure in Madagascar’s communes.  How do 
we interpret these results?  
 As discussed in part II, the macro literature on institutions offers a rather 
narrow explanation for the mechanism through which institutions affect growth: better 
property rights lead to better returns on investment (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).  
De Soto (2000) championed this argument at the micro level, but Jacoby and Minten 
(2007) find that households in Madagascar do not invest more in land with formal 
titles.  It is possible, however, that firms will invest more in land with formal titles.  
The narrow explanation for our results is that formal property rights encourage 
significantly more firm investment.  Formal titles can help firms achieve better returns 
and / or lower risks on their land, leading to more employment in manufacturing.  
Madagascar has a history of expropriation of land during the Ratsiraka government in 
the 1970s, thus firms may justifiably feel the need for formal transferable titles to their 
land.  This mechanism explains why Titled has a positive effect on Employment. 
However, it does not explain the results we see in infrastructure.  
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Table 9: Infrastructure Regressions 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Paved 
Road 
Landline 
Phone 
Service 
Cell 
Phone 
Service 
National 
Electricity 
Community 
Wells 
Estimator Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
Titled 6.43** 11.59*** 4.94* 29.44***  2.02 
(std. err.) -2.54 -3.04 -2.61 3.62 -2.65 
Security 2.12 -0.27 -2.83 3.03 0.61 
(std. err.) -1.74 -1.96 -1.73 -2.36 -1.78 
Formal Cred in Ag. -0.22 0.48 0.68 0.22 0.59 
(std. err.) -0.80 -0.98 -0.78 -0.95 -0.78 
Observations 2670 2594 2552 2374   
      
Dependent 
Variable: 
Public 
Running 
Water 
Number of 
Service 
Stations 
Number 
of Daily 
Markets 
Number of 
Seasonal 
Markets 
 Estimator Probit OLS OLS OLS 
 Titled 7.88** 2.65** 0.85 3.45 
 (std. err.) -3.22 -1.1 -4.73 -5.38 
 Security -0.27 0.66 -6.69 -0.67 
 (std. err.) -2.02 -0.88 -3.82 -3.00 
 Formal Cred in Ag. 0.60 0.61 2.64 3.21* 
 (std. err.) -0.93 -0.44 -1.85 -1.65 
 Observations 2328 2708 2708 2714 
 
 
 
 In Table 7, we see that many of the infrastructure variables that are significant 
in the first regression are insignificant in the second after we instrument for 
institutions.  We can now suggest that this change is due to the effect of Titled on 
infrastructure, as seen in table 8.  However, several infrastructure variables remained 
significant in the second regression and did not lose their effect until we accounted for 
the endogeneity of infrastructure.  This result suggests that there is something else, an 
unobserved process outside of formal property rights, that affects both Employment 
and infrastructure.   
Our results indicate that formal property rights are related to this underlying 
process, which probably reflects local governance.  Indeed, a broad interpretation of 
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the property rights results would suggest that they are capturing a good institutional 
environment rather than a direct effect of improved returns on investment.  We find 
this interpretation plausible because it offers an explanation for both the strength of the 
coefficient on Titled and the effects we see on infrastructure.   
This broad interpretation suggests that there are other related institutions that 
are important for development of the manufacturing sector and for infrastructure.  
Green (2008) finds significant effects of subjective security, expectations of law 
enforcement and corruption in a sample that includes Madagascar.  We do not find 
significant effects of subjective or objective security here, and we also have some 
measures of how people perceive local courts which are never significant.  However, 
expectations of law enforcement and corruption may be part of the process that we do 
not capture here.   
We also find a significant estimated impact of formal credit in agriculture on 
employment in manufacturing, which is surprising at first glance.  However, there are 
several reasons why credit in agriculture might matter for manufacturing.  It can 
increase fungibility for entrepreneurs operating agriculture and non-agriculture 
enterprises, there may be forward and backward linkages between small farmers, 
agribusiness and manufacturing, especially for cash crops that require post harvest 
processing.   
VI. Conclusion 
 This paper analyzes the role of institutions and infrastructure in the 
development of the manufacturing sector at the commune level in Madagascar.  We 
find that institutions do matter at such a low administrative level.  Formal land titles 
have a significant positive effect on employment in manufacturing that is robust to 
bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, endogeneity, and omission of spatial lags.  
Furthermore, formal property rights have a causal role in the development of 
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infrastructure.  We interpret the coefficients on our property rights variables as 
indications of an institutional environment that is conducive to economic growth 
rather than as a narrow effect of better returns on investment.  While we do have 
strong evidence that institutions matter at very low administrative levels, further work 
needs to be done to shed light on the mechanisms through which institutions affect 
development.   
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Chapter 4 
 
Democracy and Institutions in Postcolonial Africa 
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―If liberty and equality, as is thought by some, are chiefly to be found in democracy, 
they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the government to the 
utmost.‖ – Aristotle, Politics 
  
While Africa lags behind the rest of the world in economic development, the 
continent as a whole has experienced a wave of democratization since the end of the 
Cold War.  More African countries are democratic and fewer are autocratic today than 
ever before.  This growth of democracy raises some interesting questions for Africa: 
does it mean that African countries are ―getting institutions right‖ and will achieve 
steady economic growth (Rodrik 2004)?  Is it improving conditions for people in the 
more democratic countries?  Does it reduce the likelihood of civil war, which has been 
so destructive in Africa?   
This paper carefully considers the available evidence to answer these questions 
through cross country analysis.  I analyze the data with two distinct methods to 
account for bias due to endogeneity while also considering country and time fixed 
effects.  I find that when country and time fixed effects are included in instrumental 
variables regressions the significant effects of democracy vanish.  However, 
simultaneous equations results, which fully account for all endogenous variables and 
still include time and country fixed effects, indicate that more democratic countries 
will achieve much stronger economic growth and have lower death rates.  
Section II illustrates the background of democracy and institutions in 
postcolonial Africa.  Section III focuses on methodology and the problem of 
identification in cross-country regressions and Section IV presents instrumental 
variables (IV) regression results.  Section V describes the minimum distance 
simultaneous equations approach and presents the results of those estimations.  
Section VI concludes.  
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II. Democracy in Postcolonial Africa 
 Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has become steadily more democratic.  
This trend is easily seen using Polity scores, which are perhaps the most common 
measure of democracy in academic work.
26
  Figure 5 shows the trend of the mean 
Polity score for Africa, where the sample includes all continental Africa countries; 
each country enters the sample at independence (or for the few that were independent 
before the data series begin, when data become available).  The Polity score is 
calculated by taking a country’s democracy score, which ranges from zero to ten, and 
subtracting it’s autocracy score, which also ranges from zero to ten (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2007).  The resulting measure thus ranges from negative ten to ten.  The trend 
is clear: the mean score hits a trough in the late 1980s and then begins its ascent 
around 1990.  It briefly decreases in the late 1990s and then continues to rise.   
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Figure 5:Mean Democracy Score and GDP per capita for Africa 
Sources: WDI and POLITY IV 
 Figure 5 illustrates a wave of democratization in Africa starting in 1990.  
Research on democratization suggests that such waves are common throughout 
                                                 
26
 The POLITY dataset is publicly available at www.systemicpeace.org.   
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history; Europe experienced several waves in the nineteenth century and they have 
been the subject of close study (Huntington 1996, Van de Walle 1999).  These waves 
occur in part because countries do not exist in isolation.  When one country starts a 
revolutionary shift towards democracy, people in neighboring countries take notice 
and become more likely to attempt a change in their country, particularly if their 
neighbor is successful.
27
  A similar mechanism was at play in the independence 
movements of African countries, which also came in a large wave beginning in the 
late 1950s.  Naturally, people tend to regard such a wave of democratization as a good 
thing, but it is important to consider analytically whether it might be good or possibly 
bad.   
Scholars argue that democracy is good for several reasons.  It is associated 
with greater freedom, which is intrinsically good.  Democracy is also associated with 
better governance, which can mean better institutions that will enable economic 
growth (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001) and better public goods that will 
improve welfare.  Lastly, democratic countries are generally considered to be more 
stable and less prone to war.  The wave of democratization in Africa is clearly good in 
terms of expanded freedoms for people living in more democratic countries.  I 
examine further if these more democratic countries have an advantage in economic 
growth, in the welfare of their people and in peace and stability.   
 There tends to be a strong cross-country correlation between democracy and 
GDP per capita for the world as a whole (Acemoglu et al. 2008).  The relationship 
between democracy and national income has thus been studied carefully.  Some argue 
that economic growth and the expansion of a middle class leads to more democratic 
government (Paldam and Gundlach 2008), while others claim that good institutions, 
                                                 
27
 Charismatic revolutionaries may spread such a wave as well.  A fascinating 
historical example is Giuseppe Garibaldi, the Italian revolutionary who led liberal 
insurgencies in Italy several times, Brazil, Uruguay and France (Coppa, 2004).  
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which are associated with democracy, are necessary for economic growth to happen 
(Acemoglu et al. 2001, Rodrik et al. 2004).   
Figure 5 also plots the per capita GDP for all of Africa; it shows three trends.  
Continent-wide GDP grew from the independence period of the early 1960s until 
around 1980.  From there it decreased until the early 1990s, at which point it began an 
ongoing steady climb.  The question is what is the relationship between GDP and 
democracy for Africa as a whole?   
 Before 1990 there is no discernable positive relationship between GDP growth 
and democracy.  If anything, African countries on average became less democratic 
from the early 1960s to 1980 while their economies grew.  Both variables are 
relatively stagnant during the 1980s, then the mean Polity score begins its increase 
five years before GDP starts growing again in the mid 1990s.  For the rest of the 
sample both are increasing, suggesting that the wave of democratization may have 
contributed to the later turnaround in GDP growth.  There is no indication here that 
higher GDP contributed to the overall rise in democracy.   
 Those who argue that democracy is good for growth tend to focus on 
institutions.  Specifically, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) use Polity’s Executive 
Constraints variable as a measure of property rights institutions, which they argue are 
critical for growth.  The Executive Constraints variable scores a country from one to 
seven on how many formal constraints exist to executive power.  A higher score 
indicates greater constraints, which is interpreted as being indicative of better property 
rights (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).  If the wave of democratization contributed to 
subsequent economic growth in Africa, it is possible that the mechanism was 
improved property rights.  Figure 6 plots the mean value of the Executive Constraint 
variables for Africa against GDP per capita.  The result is very similar to Figure 5.  
The mean of the Executive Constraints variable begins to increase about five years 
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before GDP growth resumes again in the mid 1990s.  It is therefore possible that 
improved institutions contributed to the growth that began in the mid-1990s; however, 
there is no positive trend between Executive Constraints and GDP per capita prior to 
1990.  For the whole sample, the correlation between a five year lag of Executive 
Constraints and per capita GDP is small but positive at .07, although it is statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  The correlation of a five year lag of Executive 
Constraints and growth is .08, also significant at the one percent level.  It is 
noteworthy as well that the correlation of a five year lag of Polity with GDP per capita 
is only .02 and is not significant, indicating that the focus on Executive Constraints 
may be  appropriate.  
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Figure 6: Mean Executive Constraint Score and GDP per capita for Africa 
Sources: WDI and POLITY IV 
 Democratic government may produce better public goods, such as hospitals, 
that improve welfare even without leading directly to economic growth.  For example, 
Sen (1999) argues that after India became independent and democratic famines there 
were much less devastating because the government organized a response and 
prevented mass casualties.  
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Unfortunately, welfare indicators such as mortality rates, education data or 
nutritional data are not widely available for African countries for the whole 
postcolonial period.  The best indicator that is available for the whole period is the 
crude death rate, per thousand population, from the WDI database.
28
  Figure 7 plots 
the mean death rate for all of Africa. The death rate has shown a steady decline for the 
entire postcolonial period.  While this overall trend is not obviously related to the 
wave of democratization, it is possible that the death rate has decreased more in more 
democratic countries.  The correlation between death rate and Polity scores for the 
whole sample is -0.11, significant at the one percent level.  
It should be expected that HIV / AIDS has had a negative impact on the crude 
death rate in many African countries.  However, the impact of HIV / AIDS in a given 
country directly depends on the policy response to the virus, thus amplifying any 
potential relationship between democracy and the death rate.  Even for countries 
unaffected by HIV / AIDS, the crude death rate remains an intrinsically valuable 
variable and a reasonable proxy for well-being.    
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Figure 7: Mean Death Rate for Africa 
Source: WDI 
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 Details about the World Development Indicators (WDI) database can be found at 
www.worldbank.org 
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 It has been argued that democratic governments are less prone to wars internal 
and external.  The logic is that democratic governments are more inclusive, which 
allows internal opposition groups to voice their concerns through the political system 
rather than turning to violence, obviating civil conflicts.  Although interstate wars 
have been rare, civil wars have unfortunately been all too common in postcolonial 
Africa.  Figure 8 plots the number of civil wars taking place by year in postcolonial 
Africa.  The data for civil violence comes from the Major Episodes of Political 
Violence (MEPV) dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace.
29
  I use their Civil 
Violence variable, which puts total civil violence on a scale from one to ten, where 
one represents sporadic political violence and ten represents ―extensive, systematic 
and indiscriminate destruction of human resources and / or physical infrastructure‖ 
(Marshall, 2006).  A three for this variable represents serious political violence, while 
a four marks the jump to ―serious warfare‖ (Marshall, 2006).  For Figure 8, any 
episode of violence rated four or higher is counted as a civil war.  
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Figure 8: Civil Wars in Postcolonial Africa, Number of Episodes Per Year 
Source: MEPV dataset, Center for Systemic Peace 
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 The dataset is available at www.systemicpeace.org 
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 The unfortunate trend is that the number of ongoing civil wars has gradually 
increased in the postcolonial period.  The wave of democratization does not seem to 
have decreased the overall number of civil wars.  However, what the wave shows is a 
trend of political change across the continent, so it is not surprising that such a 
massive change includes many episodes of civil conflict.  It is still worth investigating 
whether the countries that have opened their political process have decreased episodes 
of civil violence.  To examine this further, I turn to Polity data on political 
participation.  
The Polity project defines ten participation concepts based on country scores 
for regulation and competition in the political system (Marshall and Jaggers, 2007).  
Countries are counted as Dictatorships if they score a one or a two, which indicates 
―repressed competition,‖ where one person or party dominates the political process 
and excludes others from participating.  Factional states score a six or a seven, which 
indicates restricted competition based on competing political factions, without any one 
being dominant.
30
  Finally, Democratic countries here are those that score an eight, 
nine or ten, indicating that the political process is competitive and liberalized or 
transitioning to a competitive liberal regime.  Table 10 presents the type of 
participation regimes, as defined by Polity, in African countries by decade.  
Table 10: Political Participation by Decade – Number of Countries of Each Regime 
Participation Regimes in Africa 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 
Dictatorship (repressed) 27 42 40 17 5 
Factional (restricted) 5 0 0 13 19 
Democratic (liberalizing) 1 3 4 10 14 
Source: POLITY IV 
                                                 
30
 A participation score of 3,4, or 5 indicates a transition from Dictatorship to an 
―uninstitutionalized state‖ and then a transition to a Factional state (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2006).  Very few countries in the sample fell into these categories.  
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 The trend in Table 10 is clear and consistent with the wave of democratization 
in Figure 5.  Most African countries were dictatorships through the late 1980s, at 
which point many began to shift towards more competitive participation regimes.  By 
2005 the number of dictatorships had dropped to five from 40 in 1985, while the 
number of democratic / liberalizing countries was up to 14 from four in 1985.  The 
number of factional regimes also increased drastically to 19 in 2005 from zero in 
1985.  Since the end of the Cold War there has been a major trend towards democratic 
governments with greater political participation in Africa.  How does this trend relate 
to civil violence? 
 Table 11 presents summary statistics for the Civil Violence variable by lagged 
participation regime.  It shows a clear trend.  Factional regimes are the most prone to 
civil violence, followed closely by dictatorships, while democratic / liberalizing 
regimes are much less prone to civil violence.  Indeed, the mean civil violence scores 
for dictatorships and factional regimes are close to one, indicating that in an average 
year those regimes experience sporadic political violence.  Taken together, Tables 10 
and 11 indicate that the continued episodes of civil violence in Africa may be 
associated with transitions from dictatorships to factional regimes and from factional 
regimes to democratic regimes.  One can hope that the wave of democratization will 
continue and episodes of civil war will decrease as more countries open their political 
systems.   
 
Table 11: Civil Violence by Participation Regime 
Participation Regime Civil Violence Mean Std. Dev. 
Dictatorship (repressed) 0.74 1.73 
Factional (restricted) 0.91 1.78 
Democratic (liberalizing) 0.10 0.39 
Source: POLITY IV and MEPV dataset 
 The data presented in this section indicate that Africa is experiencing a wave of 
democratization that began at the end of the Cold War.  This wave has included an 
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improvement in the mean level of Executive Constraints, which scholars have argued 
is critical for economic growth (Acemgolu and Johnson, 2005).  Death rates have 
consistently decreased throughout the period; it is possible that continued 
democratization can further reduce death rates across the continent.  Finally, the data 
indicate a massive shift in political participation from dictatorships into to factional 
and democratic regimes.  Dictatorships and factional regimes are more prone to civil 
wars, which remain common in Africa.  Hopefully the number of civil wars will drop 
as more African countries become democratic.  The next step is to see if the loose 
associations identified here hold up in econometric analysis. 
III. Identification in Cross Country Regressions 
 There is a long literature of cross country regressions looking at institutions 
and GDP levels or growth, which can be broadly divided into three phases based on 
the question of identification.  The initial phase began when reasonable cross country 
data first became widely available.  Data sets typically had small samples that limited 
the number of variables in any one regression, so the first identification concern was 
simply a question of which variables belonged in a small sample regression.  Many 
papers presented different variables that were significant in some specification of a 
cross-country regression on growth or GDP.  This first phase culminated in Sala-I-
Martin’s (1997) ―million regressions‖ paper, in which he attempted to settle the 
question of which variables belong in cross country regressions by actually running 
several million regressions and seeing which variables were consistently significant.  
His results indicate that political institutions are significant determinants of GDP; 
however, his million regressions were OLS regressions that did not account for 
endogeneity.     
 Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) began the second phase by finding 
plausible instruments for institutions in a cross-country regression.  Their seminal 
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paper has spawned many other works using instrumental variables to identify the 
effects of endogenous variables on growth or GDP.  Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 
(2004), for example, use instruments for institutions and trade integration to test the 
effects of institutions, trade integration and geography on GDP across countries.  They 
find that institutions ―rule‖ over trade integration and geography as a determinant of 
GDP.  Miguel et al. (2004) use rainfall as an instrument to show that negative growth 
shocks increase the likelihood of civil war in Africa.  Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
attempt to push the IV approach as far as possible and conclude that due to the paucity 
of instruments it is impossible to ―unbundle‖ institutions at the country level.  
Although Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) conclude that country level institutions 
cannot be ―unbundled,‖ the IV literature formed a consensus that institutions are a 
significant determinant of long-term growth across countries.  Research in this phase 
focused on parsimonious specifications, being careful to not include variables that 
might be endogenous without proper instruments.   
This second phase is now coming to an end, interestingly, due to the paper 
―Income and Democracy‖ by Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Yared (2008).  In 
―Income and Democracy,‖ they put together a panel of countries and show that when 
country and time fixed effects are introduced, the effect of income on democracy 
disappears.  Their paper focuses solely on the effect of income on democracy in the 
presence of fixed effects; they do not argue that it calls into question the earlier IV 
results.  However, the instruments used in most of the IV regressions are time-
invariant, so they cannot be used in a specification that also includes fixed effects.  It 
is therefore an open, and very important, question as to whether the IV results hold 
with country and time fixed effects.   
The focus on endogeneity in the IV literature led to intentional omission of 
variables.  When fixed effects are introduced in a small sample, they capture a large 
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portion of the variance so it is to be expected that coefficients change drastically.  The 
variance in a panel of countries can be divided into the within and between variance, 
where the within variance is measured as variation from a country specific mean and 
the between variance is variation between the country specific mean and the pooled 
mean.  Country fixed effects effectively capture all of the between variance, leaving 
only the within variance to identify the coefficients of interest.  The within variance 
makes up 77% of the variance of Growth, but only 34% and 40% of the variance of 
Death Rate and Civil Violence respectively.  Of the institutional variables, the within 
variance makes up 48%, 47% and 60% of the variance of the Polity, Executive 
Constraints and Participation variables.  I thus expect fixed effects to markedly change 
the results of IV regressions on institutions.   
Since IV specifications intentionally left out many endogenous variables, the 
types of IV regressions seen in the second phase of this literature are now called into 
question and must be seen as underspecified.  Thus the literature has now entered 
phase three, where it is necessary to account for country and time fixed effects.   
Accounting for the endogeneity of institutions while also including country 
and time fixed effects requires an instrumental variable that varies across countries 
and over time.  The common instruments for institutions in the literature are settler 
mortality rates and indicator variables for different colonial masters, neither of which 
varies over time.  The literature as it stands is thus in a quandary: researchers can use 
the accepted instruments to account for endogeneity or include fixed effects, but not 
both. 
I present two estimation methods here that account for endogeneity and include 
fixed effects.  The first introduces an instrument that varies across countries and over 
time; I claim that a weighted average of Polity scores of neighboring countries is a 
plausible instrument for democracy and I present such IV estimates in the following 
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section.  The second method uses a minimum distance simultaneous equations 
estimator to account for all endogenous variables while still including fixed effects.  I 
outline this method fully and present the results in Section V.   
IV. Instrumental Variables Estimates with Fixed Effects 
 In section II I outlined the trend of democratization in Africa and presented 
three mechanisms through which democracy may be instrumentally good.  The first is 
that democracy may lead to better institutions, which then promote growth.  I 
investigate this trend in a regression of Growth on the Executive Constraints variable.  
The second is that democracy may improve welfare, which is measured here by the 
Death Rate, which I regress on the Polity score.  Finally, democracy may obviate civil 
war through a more inclusive politics.  I investigate this by regressing the Civil 
Violence variable on political participation.  For all three regressions, I use a spatial 
lag of Polity scores as the key instrumental variable.   
   A spatial lag is a weighted average of the values of a variable for neighboring 
countries.  The intuition behind spatial lags is that in a sample of contiguous units it is 
likely that the effects of some variables will be present in neighboring units.  The 
types of weights used to calculate spatial lags vary; for this research I use inverse 
distance from the country center as the weight because it is clearly exogenous and it 
gives close neighbors a stronger weight than those further away.  The spatial lag of 
Polity thus gives a value for each country in each period that is the weighted average 
of the Polity scores of all other countries in the sample, with the closest neighbors 
receiving the strongest weight.   
A valid instrument must meet the exclusion restriction that it correlates 
strongly with the endogenous covariate but does not affect the dependent variable 
directly.  For the spatial lag of Polity to be valid it must correlate strongly with the 
endogenous covariates: Executive Constraints, Polity and Participation, but have no 
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direct effect on Growth, Death Rate or Civil Violence.  I claim first that it is 
reasonable to assume that the Polity scores of other countries do not have a direct 
effect on Growth, Death Rate or Civil Violence in any one country simply because 
policies affecting these variables are made by countries, not by their neighbors.   
I claim next that the level of democracy in neighboring countries should affect 
the level of democracy in a given country, thus leading to a positive correlation 
between Polity scores and the Polity spatial lag.  I outlined earlier the trends in 
democracy in postcolonial Africa and the wave of democratization that began around 
1990.  The fact that such a wave exists suggests that democratization in one country is 
associated with democratization in another; indeed, history is full of such incidences.  
The timing of the wave is no coincidence either.  The end of the Cold War was seen as 
the victory of the democratic / capitalist system and the wave of revolution in Eastern 
Europe clearly was felt in Africa as well.  Thus the history of democracy is full of 
horizontal expansion – across many countries at the same time rather than 
independently in each country.  It is reasonable then to expect the spatial lag of 
democracy to correlate strongly with the level of democracy in any country.  Indeed, 
the correlations with the variables of interest are positive: the spatial lag of Polity has 
pairwise correlations of 0.33 with Executive Constraints, 0.24 with Polity and 0.20 
with Participation.    
The other estimation concerns are including country and time fixed effects and 
including other endogenous variables.  I present four regressions for each dependent 
variable.  The first two do not include other endogenous covariates.  The first and third 
include time and country fixed effects while the second and fourth do not.  These 
regressions give an indication of whether or not fixed effects change the results and 
whether adding other endogenous covariates changes the results.   
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The data used here have been pulled together from many sources, which are 
detailed in the descriptive tables and in the references.  The base sample is the 
continent of Africa.  I limit the sample to Africa because it is more fitting to a 
regression framework than other parts of the world for two reasons.  First, the borders 
of African countries were largely determined by the colonial powers in Berlin in 1884-
85, so they are clearly exogenous to the current political regimes.  Having exogenous 
borders makes cross country regressions more believable because the borders 
delineate the units of analysis.  In places like Europe or Southeast Asia where borders 
were determined by political and military power it is possible that the delineation of 
the units of analysis is endogenous to the variables of interest.   
Second, African countries became independent relatively recently, mostly 
within the same time period, and they have had similar experiences both prior to and 
after independence.  The independence date thus gives a clear start point for each 
country to enter the data and the similarity of experiences makes comparisons across 
countries more believable.  The relatively recent event of independence from a 
colonial regime also provides for a set of time-invariant exogenous variables 
measuring conditions at independence.   
The next three tables present descriptive statistics of the variables used.  The 
data are an unbalanced panel that has been averaged over three year periods.  Data are 
not available for all African countries in every period, but I have attempted to find the 
most expansive reliable data to cover as much of the postcolonial period as possible.  
The final sample has 411 observations over 13 periods covering the years 1963 to 
2001.  It includes 45 countries, nearly every country in Africa.
31
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 The sample does not include the small island states of Cape Verde, Comoros, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Seychelles and Mauritius.  The only mainland countries not in the 
sample are Equatorial Guinea, Somalia, Liberia and Western Sahara, each of which 
lacked sufficient data.  
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Table 12: Summary Statistics for Endogenous Variables 
Variable Source Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Growth of GDP per capita WDI 0.71 3.87 -12.62 17.38 
Death Rate (per thousand) WDI 15.84 4.99 4.03 37.62 
Civil Violence (sum over period) MEPV 1.83 4.41 0.00 21.00 
Savings (% of GDP) WDI 12.60 10.63 -24.53 46.72 
Trade (% of GDP, lagged one 
period) 
WDI 62.49 31.97 9.31 171.00 
Aid per capita (US$, lagged one 
period) 
WDI 33.95 31.87 0.59 239.91 
GDP per capita (US$, lagged one 
period) 
WDI 693.59 960.53 94.88 7456.51 
Executive Constraints (lagged 
one period) 
POLITY IV 2.39 1.46 1.00 7.00 
Polity (lagged one period) POLITY IV -4.73 4.83 -10.00 9.00 
Participation (lagged one period) POLITY IV 2.89 2.84 1.00 10.00 
  
Table 12 presents the summary statistics for ten endogenous variables.  These 
variables are endogenous because they are all affected directly and indirectly by the 
choices of the government.  Growth and Death Rate are averaged over each three year 
period while the Civil Violence variable is summed over each period.  Savings is 
national savings as a percentage of GDP at the beginning of the period.  Trade, Aid 
per capita, GDP per capita, Executive Constraints and Polity are all lagged one period.  
The Participation variable is measured at the beginning of each period and is made up 
of the ten participation concepts identified in the POLITY data (Marshall and Jaggers, 
2006). One represents the least participatory regime and ten the most.  
Table 13 presents the first set of exogenous variables, which appear in the 
instrumental variables regressions without fixed effects because they are all time-
invariant.
32
  The first is a measure of the percentage of the population in Koeppen-
Geiger temperature zones from the Center for International Development (CID) at 
Harvard University.
33
  Next are indicators for the three main colonial powers and 
                                                 
32
 Other exogenous variables were initially included as well but were dropped due to 
insignificance.  
33
 See www.cid.harvard.edu 
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indicators for exports of oil or diamonds.  The final two variables measure the polity 
score and cereal yield at independence. 
Table 13:  Exogenous Variables in IV Regressions 
Variable Source Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Population in K-G temp zone (%) CID 10.62 25.43 0.00 98.00 
British Colony World Factbook 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00 
French Colony World Factbook 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Portugese Colony World Factbook 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Oil World Factbook 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Diamonds World Factbook 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Initial Polity Score POLITY IV -3.18 5.11 -9.00 8.00 
Initial Cereal Yield WDI 858.16 549.34 264.62 3316.77 
 
Table 14 presents exogenous variables that vary across countries and over 
time.  The first two measure the change in temperature and precipitation as a 
percentage of the country average, which come from the Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research.
34
  Population density measures people per square kilometer and 
Years independent is measured at the beginning of each period.  The spatial lags of 
other endogenous variables were created in the same way as the Polity spatial lag 
described earlier.   
 
Table 14: Exogenous Variables that Vary Across Countries and Over Time 
Variable Source Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Change in Temperature (% of avg.) Tyndall  0.19 1.20 -3.45 3.34 
Change in Precipitation (% of avg.) Tyndall  -0.60 13.40 -47.85 40.36 
Population Density (lagged one per.) WDI 36.88 45.66 0.89 286.43 
Years Independent  23.26 11.07 2.00 54.00 
Civil Violence Spatial Lag MEPV 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.12 
Polity Spatial Lag (lagged one per.) POLITY IV -0.07 0.04 -0.17 0.03 
GDP pc Spatial Lag (lagged one per.) WDI 10.39 3.36 2.49 27.15 
Savings Spatial Lag WDI 0.19 0.05 0.06 0.40 
Trade Spatial Lag (lagged one per.) WDI 1.00 0.31 0.29 1.92 
Death Rate Spatial Lag WDI 0.26 0.07 0.12 0.48 
 
                                                 
34
 The data is available from http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/~timm/data/index-table.html 
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Equation 1 is the basic specification for Growth: 
yit = βxit + γzit +µit   (1) 
where xit is a vector of endogenous covariates and zit a vector of exogenous 
covariates.  In a panel data model, µit = ci + tt + εit, where ci and tt are the country and 
time fixed effects, respectively, and εit is the true stochastic error term.  Estimating (1) 
without time and country fixed effects assumes that ci and tt are orthogonal to xit and 
zit.  If this assumption is false, the estimates of β and γ are biased; if it is true then the 
estimates of β and γ will not change when fixed effects are included.  
Determining which variables belong in zit can be settled empirically since the 
variables are exogenous.  The strategy I use is simply to start with a broad set of 
variables and drop those that are clearly insignificant, so long as their omission does 
not have any clear effects on other estimated coefficients.  Determining which 
variables belong in xit requires much greater consideration since instruments are not 
available for most endogenous covariates.  
I consider five endogenous covariates in equation (1).  The first is Executive 
Constraints, which is the variable of interest due to the expected positive relationship 
between Executive Constraints and Growth identified in the empirical literature on 
institutions (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).  The second is Savings, which is a 
traditional component of capital-accumulation growth models and therefore can be 
expected to increase growth.  The third is Trade, which has been a key driver of 
growth in many countries and is therefore also expected to have a positive effect on 
growth.  The fourth is GDP per capita, which is included because the traditional 
growth model suggests countries starting at lower levels of GDP per capita should 
grow faster initially, the catch-up effect.  I thus expect a negative estimated coefficient 
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on GDP per capita.  The last endogenous variable in (1) is Aid per capita.  While the 
effectiveness of international aid in Africa is hotly contested, the intentions of aid 
include political and economic stabilization, compensation from adverse shocks and 
laying foundations for development, all of which should have a positive impact on 
growth.   
The estimations for Death Rate and Civil Violence take the same form as 
equation (1), although with slightly different endogenous variables.  The Death Rate 
estimation includes Polity rather than Executive Constraints since the hypothesis is 
that greater democracy leads to better public goods.  The Death Rate estimation 
includes Aid per capita, which may be directly targeted at diseases such as malaria, 
and GDP per capita as an indicator of a country’s ability to provide public goods.  
Savings and Trade are not included in the Death Rate Equation.   
The Civil Violence estimation includes Participation as the institutional 
variable of interest and Growth, GDP per capita and Aid per capita are the other 
endogenous variables present.  Growth is present because negative growth shocks 
have been shown to increase the likelihood of civil conflict (Miguel et al, 2004).  GDP 
per capita is included because it is thought that persistent poverty may lead to conflict 
and that countries with higher per capita GDP will thus be less prone to civil war.  
Finally, Aid per capita is included again because Aid is often targeted at crisis areas 
with the intention of obviating or alleviating pressures that might lead to violence.   
I instrument for Executive Constraints, Polity and Participation with the spatial 
lag of Polity, as discussed above, as well as other relevant exogenous variables such as 
indicators for colonial masters and the Cold War and the initial Polity score for each 
country.  Table 15 presents the first stage estimates on each of the three institutional 
variables.  
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Table 15: First Stage Estimates 
 Executive Const. Polity Participation 
Polity Spatial Lag 9.05*** (3.30) 29.98** (12.91) 21.12*** (7.56) 
British Colony 0.51 (0.34) 1.11 (1.20) 0.13 (0.56) 
French Colony 0.73*** (0.22) 1.37 (0.94) 0.76 (0.49) 
Portuguese Colony 1.45*** (0.27) 0.69 (1.62) -0.55 (1.08) 
Coldwar -0.30 (0.18) -1.00* (0.55) -0.96*** (0.33) 
Initial Polity 0.14*** (0.03) 0.43*** (0.13) 0.17** (0.07) 
Percent in K-G Temperate Zone  -3.47** (1.36)  
Initial Cereal Yield  -0.001* (0.0007)  
Trade spatial Lag  1.93 (1.19) 2.31*** (0.80) 
Oil   -0.55 (0.38) 
Diamond   1.15 (1.09) 
R-squared 0.32 0.35 0.35 
         The coefficient on the Polity Spatial Lag is positive and significant in each 
estimation.  Other exogenous variables were dropped when insignificant and when 
excluding them had no strong effect on any other coefficient.  Overall, the first stage 
estimates are consistent with a valid instrument.   
 Table 16 presents four IV estimates on Growth.  The first two specifications 
exclude other endogenous variables; the first includes fixed effects and the second 
does not.  The third and fourth include other endogenous variables.  The most striking 
result in Table 16 is that the estimated coefficient on Executive Constraints is 
significant only when fixed effects are not included.  It is marginally insignificant (p-
value of .13) without fixed effects when endogenous covariates are included, but it is 
clearly insignificant when fixed effects are present.  The estimated coefficients on 
Savings and GDP per capita are significant and have the expected signs with and 
without fixed effects.  The estimated coefficient on Aid per capita is significant only 
without fixed effects and the coefficient on Trade is never significant.   
The estimated coefficient on change in precipitation is positive and significant 
in three of the specifications.  The estimated coefficient on change in temperature is 
never close to being significant.  The results on Growth indicate that in the presence of 
time and country fixed effects the estimated coefficient on Executive Constraints is 
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clearly insignificant.  I next consider Death Rate to see if the effect is the same.  Table 
17 presents four regressions on Death Rate in the same form as Table 16. 
Table 16: IV Regressions on Growth with and without Fixed Effects 
Fixed Effects? yes no yes no 
Endogenous Covariates? no no yes yes 
Executive Constraints 0.072 0.754 -0.015 0.610 
     (std. err) 1.60 0.45 1.68 0.39 
     (p-value) 0.96 0.10 0.99 0.13 
Change in Temperature -0.044 -0.001 0.025 0.006 
     (std. err) 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.14 
     (p-value) 0.69 0.99 0.84 0.96 
Change in Precipitation 0.020 0.023 0.016 0.021 
     (std. err) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
     (p-value) 0.09 0.02 0.18 0.04 
Savings   0.050 0.088 
     (std. err)   0.03 0.03 
     (p-value)   0.07 0.00 
Trade   0.003 -0.006 
     (std. err)   0.02 0.01 
     (p-value)   0.86 0.52 
GDPpc   -0.006 -0.001 
     (std. err)   0.00 0.00 
     (p-value)   0.00 0.00 
Aid per capita   0.006 0.016 
     (std. err)   0.01 0.01 
     (p-value)   0.57 0.08 
R-Squared 0.35 0.19 0.51 0.23 
 The results in Table 17 indicate that the estimated coefficients on every 
variable change when fixed effects are included.  The effects of Polity are insignificant 
in every specification, although the estimated coefficient is negative without fixed 
effects and positive with them.  The estimated coefficients on Aid and GDP per capita 
are significant with the expected sign without fixed effects but are clearly insignificant 
with them.  The coefficient on the Death Rate spatial lag is the only estimate that is 
close to significance when fixed effects are included.
35
  The Death Rate IV regressions 
indicate again that fixed effects are necessary.   
                                                 
35
 Interestingly, the estimated coefficient on Polity is negative and significant without 
fixed effects when the Death Rate spatial lag is not included.  This result indicates that 
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Table 17: IV Regressions on Death Rate with and without Fixed Effects 
Fixed Effects? yes no* yes no* 
Endogenous Covariates? no no yes yes 
Polity 0.464 -0.112 0.451 -0.114 
     (std. err) 0.40 0.25 0.40 0.20 
     (p-value) 0.25 0.66 0.26 0.56 
Death Rate Spatial Lag 12.088  12.290  
     (std. err) 7.99  7.98  
     (p-value) 0.14  0.13  
Aid per capita   0.008 -0.028 
     (std. err)   0.01 0.02 
     (p-value)   0.51 0.10 
GDP per capita   0.000 -0.001 
     (std. err)   0.00 0.00 
     (p-value)   0.90 0.10 
R-squared 0.88 0.63 0.88 0.66 
*Estimates without fixed effects included a number of time-invariant and country-invariant controls 
 I turn now to estimates on Civil Violence in Table 18.  The Civil Violence 
estimates also indicate that fixed effects are necessary.  The estimated coefficient on 
Participation is negative and significant without fixed effects but is insignificant when 
fixed effects are present.  The estimated coefficients on population density and the 
civil violence spatial lag are consistent across specifications, while the coefficients on 
Growth and Aid change when fixed effects are present.  The coefficient on change in 
precipitation has the expected sign but is only significant in one specification while the 
coefficient on GDP has the expected sign and is significant with and without fixed 
effects.  The presence of fixed effects in the Civil Violence regressions does not 
change every coefficient, but it does render the estimated coefficient on Participation 
insignificant.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the regression without the spatial lag is underspecified and thus subject to omitted 
variable bias due to the omission of the spatial lag.   
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Table 18: IV Regressions on Civil Violence with and without fixed effects 
Fixed Effects? yes no yes no 
Endogenous Covariates? no no no no 
Participation -0.414 -0.939 -0.300 -0.699 
     (std. err) 0.49 0.53 0.41 0.30 
     (p-value) 0.40 0.08 0.47 0.03 
Change in Precipitation -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.001 
     (std. err) 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
     (p-value) 0.35 0.04 0.54 0.20 
Population Density 0.046 0.022 0.044 0.011 
     (std. err) 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.01 
     (p-value) 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.06 
Civil Violence Spatial Lag -66.96 -68.675 -70.35 -68.304 
     (std. err) 20.82 20.18 20.32 17.73 
     (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Growth   -0.104 -0.031 
     (std. err)   0.05 0.05 
     (p-value)   0.06 0.50 
Aid per capita   -0.020 -0.042 
     (std. err)   0.02 0.01 
     (p-value)   0.26 0.01 
GDP per capita   -0.001 -0.001 
     (std. err)   0.00 0.00 
     (p-value)   0.10 0.04 
R-squared 0.63 0.30 0.64 0.31 
 
 The estimations presented above indicate that country and time fixed effects 
capture important variation that renders the effects of institutional variables 
insignificant.  Fixed effects capture unobserved characteristics of the units of analysis; 
their importance here suggests that the equations without fixed effects are omitting 
significant factors that impact both institutions and the dependent variables.    
 The data are a three year panel while many of the major papers showing 
significant effects of institutions use a cross section of countries to analyze the long 
run determinants of GDP per capita (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robison 2001, 
Acemoglu and Johnson 2005, Rodrik et al. 2004).  One might be tempted to argue 
then that those estimations are substantially different and fixed effects are not needed 
in them.  Such an argument is incorrect.  A panel is simply cross sections stacked over 
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time.  Without fixed effects, a panel estimation is equivalent to the cross section data 
used in those papers, only with a larger sample.  It is evident in Tables 16 and 18 that 
the institutional variables are consistently significant without fixed effects, much as 
they have been found to be in the IV estimates in the literature.  Given the vast 
changes in the estimated coefficients on institutions when fixed effects are introduced, 
one must presume that the earlier estimates in the literature would change in a similar 
fashion.   
It is for this reason that I claim the literature is now moving into a third phase 
where fixed effects must be accounted for.  The most straightforward way to estimate 
the effects of institutions while including fixed effects is to use an instrument that 
varies across countries and over time, as in the above estimates.  However, there are 
still many limitations to the estimates presented above.  The biggest is other 
endogenous covariates.  The IV literature tends to exclude other endogenous variables, 
but the fixed effects results suggest that such omission may be a source of bias.  Of 
course, including the endogenous variables without instruments also may introduce 
bias.  The only other alternative is to account for all of the endogenous variables in a 
simultaneous equations model.   
V. Simultaneous Equations Estimation 
 The technique used here is best illustrated through a simple example.  Consider 
a two equation model with two endogenous variables, x1 and x2, and two exogenous 
variables, z1 and z2.  Suppose the model is as follows:  
 x1 = α11x2 + α12z1 + µ1 (2) 
 x2 = α21x1 + α22z2 + µ2 (3) 
 The basic idea is to use substitution to solve (2) and (3) so that each is written 
only as a function of the exogenous variables.  Such substitution yields the following 
coefficients on the exogenous variables:  
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 z1 z2 
x1 α12/(1-α11α21) α11α22/(1-α11α21) 
x2 α21α12/(1-α11α21) α22/(1-α11α21) 
 Suppose now that we regress both x1 and x2 each on z1 and z2.  We have 
avoided endogeneity in the regression and we can now solve for the coefficients in 
equations (2) and (3).  Denote the regression coefficients by πij.  Algebraic substitution 
gives that π21/π11 = α21 and π12/π22 = α11.  Substituting those values into π11 and π22 
gives α12 and α22 and the system is solved.   
 In the simple example above the system is exactly identified: there are four 
structural parameters from (2) and (3) and four reduced form estimated coefficients, 
which yields a unique solution.  In the estimates I present below the system is 
overidentified so there are multiple possible solutions.  However, the basic strategy is 
the same.  I start by regressing each of the ten endogenous variables in Table 3 on the 
ten exogenous variables in Table 5 and country and time fixed effects.  A 
simultaneous equations estimator such as GLS is appropriate; however, since the right 
hand side of each equation is the same GLS is equivalent to equation by equation 
OLS, which I estimate (Greene 2003).  The results are 100 reduced form estimated 
coefficients, which I stack into a vector denoted Π.  The country and time fixed effects 
are included in the first stage estimates but not in the vector Π.36   
 The structural parameters, denoted αij, are determined by which endogenous 
variables are included and which exogenous variables are excluded from each 
equation in the model.  For Growth, Death Rate and Civil Violence the model includes 
the endogenous variables presented in the IV estimates.  These endogenous variables 
are the other seven endogenous variables in the model, and each has its own structural 
                                                 
36
 The fixed effects coefficients could be added to Π, but would simply complicate 
solving the model without affecting the variables of interest, which are identified from 
the exogenous variables in the model.  
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equation, which are presented in Appendix 9.  The structural model is solved through 
algebraic substitution as in the example above.  The result is a 10 x 10 matrix that 
assigns the structural parameters for each reduced form coefficient, again as in the 
example above.  I stack this matrix into a vector, which is denoted Α.  The system can 
now be written as a minimum distance problem: 
 minα (Π-A)’Ω
-1(Π-A) (4) 
 where Ω is the variance of Π.  Simultaneous equations estimation has rarely 
been used in the literature, but it has several advantages.
37
  The parameters of interest 
on the endogenous covariates are identified from a set of exclusion restrictions in the 
structural model.  In the example above, z2 is excluded from (2) and z1 is excluded 
from (3).  Without these restrictions the model could not be solved; they are similar to 
the exclusion restrictions required in IV estimation.  However, the minimum distance 
framework in (4) gives a test of the overidentifying restrictions of the model (Jakubson 
2008).  When the minimum distance problem is weighted by the inverse variance of 
the unrestricted vector, as in (4), the minimum distance estimator is efficient and the 
objective function, denoted d(α), has the following distribution: 
 n*d(α) ~ chi2 (q-p) (5) 
 where n is the number of observations, q is the number of reduced-form 
(unrestricted) coefficients and p is the number of parameters (restrictions) in A 
(Jakubson 2008).  This simultaneous equations approach is thus similar to the IV 
approach in that exclusion restrictions are necessary for identification, but it has the 
advantage of providing a test of the restrictions, which is not possible in IV estimation.  
The simultaneous equations model also allows for exploration of other pathways 
through which institutions might affect Growth, Death Rate and Civil Violence.  For 
                                                 
37
 With the notable exception of Ngelaza et al. (2006), whose excellent paper uses 
simultaneous equations and also carefully constructs spatial variables.  
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example, the structural equation for Savings includes Death Rate, Executive 
Constraints and Civil Violence, so it allows us to consider if those endogenous 
variables affect Growth indirectly through savings.  
 The model I estimate has 100 unrestricted reduced form coefficients in Π and 
90 structural parameters in A.  The weight matrix Ω is the variance matrix from the 
reduced form simultaneous equations regressions.  Since Ω is calculated from the 
reduced form residuals, serial or spatial autocorrelation in the first stage affects Ω, 
which can then bias the structural estimates.  I therefore carefully examine each first 
stage residual for serial and spatial autocorrelation and correct nine residuals for serial 
autocorrelation and five for spatial autocorrelation.
38
  I estimate the structural model 
by solving (4); the resulting test statistic n*d(α) ~ chi2 (10) equals 9.86, indicating no 
evidence against the overidentifying restrictions in the model.  Table 19 presents the 
simultaneous equations estimates on Growth.  
 
Table 19: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on Growth 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Executive Constraints 1.3838 0.204 0.000 
Savings 0.0161 0.014 0.257 
Trade 0.0080 0.032 0.803 
GDP per capita -0.0004 0.003 0.877 
Aid per capita 0.1098 0.060 0.069 
Change in Precipitation 0.6326 3.998 0.874 
Change in Temperature -0.1289 6.758 0.985 
  
 The results indicate that Executive Constraints do have a significant and large 
positive effect on Growth.  A one point increase in the Executive Constraints score 
(which ranges from one to seven) is estimated to increase Growth on average by 1.38 
percent.  Savings has a positive estimated coefficient but is insignificant and the 
estimated coefficients on Trade, GDP per capita, Precipitation and Temperature are 
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 The details can be found in Appendix 10.   
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clearly insignificant.  The estimated coefficient on Aid per capita is positive and 
significant.  It indicates that an increase in Aid per capita of about $9.00 would on 
average increase Growth by one percent.  This is a large estimated effect of Aid on 
Growth.  Rajan and Subramanian (2007) for example, survey the literature on Aid and 
Growth and argue that a realistic empirical effect of Aid/GDP on Growth should range 
from 0.03 to 0.16.  In those terms, the estimated result here is equivalent to about 0.77. 
These results differ markedly from the IV estimates with fixed effects, especially on 
the Executive Constraints variable.  
Table 20: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on Death Rate 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Polity -0.2179 0.038 0.000 
Aid per capita 0.1363 0.057 0.016 
GDP per capita 0.0001 0.006 0.982 
Death Rate Spatial Lag 20.3974 5.261 0.000 
Trade Spatial Lag -8.1092 0.992 0.000 
Savings Spatial Lag -10.8467 1.550 0.000 
Change in Precipitation -3.8364 7.196 0.594 
Change in Temperature 0.2901 4.120 0.944 
 Table 20 presents the simultaneous equations results on Death Rate.  The 
estimated coefficient on Polity is negative and significant, indicating that a one point 
increase in the polity score would on average lower the Death Rate by 0.22 people per 
thousand.  This estimate differs greatly from the IV estimates, where the coefficient on 
Polity was never significant.  The estimated coefficient on Aid per capita is 
surprisingly positive and significant.  The coefficient on the Death Rate Spatial lag is 
positive and significant, which is consistent with the fixed effects IV results.  The 
Death Rate results do indicate a positive effect of democracy and differ significantly 
from the IV results.   
 
 
 110 
Table 21: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on Civil Violence 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Participation -0.7935 0.902 0.379 
Growth 0.4003 0.383 0.296 
GDP per capita 0.0051 0.009 0.563 
Aid per capita -0.3675 0.325 0.258 
Civil Violence Spatial Lag -41.9491 5.592 0.000 
 Table 21 presents the simultaneous equations estimates on Civil Violence.  The 
estimated coefficients on Participation, Growth and GDP per capita are all 
insignificant.  The insignificance of the Growth and GDP per capita coefficients 
differs from the IV results where both coefficients were negative and significant.  The 
only significant coefficient is the estimate on the Civil Violence spatial lag, which is 
surprisingly negative.  This coefficient is also significant and negative in the IV 
estimation, indicating a consistent result that civil violence in neighboring countries 
lowers contemporaneous civil violence in a given country.  This result contradicts the 
common notion that civil violence is a chaotic force likely to spread across countries; 
however, the positive result may simply be due to the contemporaneous variables.  
Further regressions (not reported) that add in a temporal lag of the Civil Violence 
spatial lag find that it has a positive estimated coefficient, indicating that there may be 
a chaotic spread of civil violence but it takes a few years to make a significant impact.  
It is possible that the negative estimated coefficient on the contemporaneous variable 
is indicative of government action to clamp down quickly on civil violence when 
conflict breaks out in neighboring countries.   
 The simultaneous equations results for the other endogenous variables are in 
Appendix 9.  The most interesting result from the other equations is that Executive 
Constraints is found to have a large significant positive effect on GDP per capita; an 
increase of one in the Executive Constraints score is estimated to increase GDP per 
capita by $104, significant at the one percent level.  GDP per capita, however, is not 
estimated to have any significant effect on the Executive Constraints score.  These 
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results are consistent with institutions causing long-term growth and inconsistent with 
institutions evolving naturally along with GDP (Paldam and Gundlach, 2008) 
VI. Discussion and Conclusion.  
 Given the ongoing wave of democratization in Africa, this paper asked what 
the effects of democracy might be.  Specifically, I considered if democracy would lead 
to economic growth through better institutions, if democracy would lead to a lower 
death rate and if democracy would reduce civil conflict through increased 
participation.   
 I estimate the effect of institutions on three variables of interest with both 
instrumental variables and simultaneous equations regressions.  It is clear from the IV 
estimates that fixed effects are necessary.  The estimated coefficients on most 
variables change drastically when fixed effects are introduced, indicating that 
estimates without fixed effects are likely biased.  I find no significant effects of the 
institutional variables in the IV estimates.  These results call into question much of the 
earlier literature on institutions and growth, which uses cross-sectional data and thus 
cannot include fixed effects.   
 The simultaneous equations estimation, which also includes country and time 
fixed effects, finds significant effects of institutions on Growth and Death Rate.  The 
estimated effect of democracy on Death Rate is not large, but the estimated effect of 
Executive Constraints on Growth is very large.  The simultaneous equations estimates 
also indicate that Executive Constraints has a large positive effect on GDP per capita.  
These results indicate that the strongest effect of the wave of democratization in Africa 
may be increased economic growth through improved institutions.   
The simultaneous equations estimates differ from the IV estimates.  I find the 
simultaneous equations model to be more believable because it accounts for the 
endogeneity of all ten endogenous variables and the test of the overidentifying 
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restrictions in the model indicates no evidence against those restrictions.  These results 
thus indicate that simultaneous equations estimation may be a more productive method 
for future research.  
 The blossoming of democracy in Africa since the end of the Cold War is 
intrinsically good.  I find that it also is instrumentally good.  Improvements in 
democracy are estimated to lower the Death Rate and also lead to much stronger 
economic growth through better institutions.   
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APPENDIX 1: CONSTRUCTION OF INSTITUTIONAL VARIABLES AND 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER MEASURES 
To create the regional institutional variables, I first identified variables of 
interest from the Afrobarometer survey.  These variables are all measured on an 
ordinal scale.  For example, the question may be ―do you trust your local 
representative?‖ and the answers are ―always,‖ ―most of the time,‖ ―sometimes,‖ 
―rarely,‖ or ―never.‖  I took the variables and calculated the percentages of each 
response by region.  I also grouped the responses in different combinations.  For 
example, I calculated the percentage of people who ―always‖ or ―most of the time‖ 
trust their local representative, and the percentage of people who ―always,‖ ―most of 
the time‖ and ―sometimes‖ trust their representatives.  Thus each ordinal question 
from the survey yields five to seven potential variables.  I selected the potential 
variable with the highest variance across all regions as the regional measure.  This 
method effectively captures the variation in the data without arbitrarily indexing the 
responses.   
 Since I am using subjective variables as regional indicators of corruption, 
contract enforcement, etc., some comparison of the variables used here with other 
common measures of governance is needed.  Unfortunately, regional data on 
governance in Africa is not available.  Thus I computed the country-level variables for 
each of the Afrobarometer variables for all thirteen countries (with the exception of 
Law, which is replaced here by Law-tax) and compared them with Freedom House 
scores and selected indices from the Mo Ibrahim index of governance.
39
  Tables A1 
                                                 
39
  See www.freedomhouse.org and www.moibrahimfoundation.org respectively for 
more information on these measures.  Law-tax replaces Law here because factor 
scores created from a sample of 13 would be substantively different from those created 
from a sample of 151, whereas Law-tax is a percentage measure and is comparable 
across different levels of aggregation.  
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and A2 present the correlations of the Afrobarometer indicators with the Mo Ibrahim 
measures and Freedom House Scores, respectively.  
Table A1: Comparison of Afrobarometer and Mo Ibrahim Measures 
 
The variables from the Mo Ibrahim (hereafter MI) foundation are all indices 
that range from zero to 100, and all are scaled so that higher scores are better.  Thus 
the expectation is that Crime, Reps Corrupt and Police Corrupt will all be negatively 
correlated with the MI measures, and strongly so with those that are closest to what 
the Afrobarometer variables measure.  Law-tax and the trust variables should 
generally be positively correlated with the MI variables.   
 Crime is negatively correlated with MI safety, as expected, but is surprisingly 
positively correlated with MI contracts.  Law-tax has no large correlations and is 
surprisingly negatively correlated with MI contracts and MI rule of law etc.  The trust 
variables are moderately correlated with MI safety, but negatively correlated with MI 
contracts.  It seems that MI contracts is not a clear variable.  Reps Corrupt and Police 
Corrupt are negatively correlated with all the MI variables as expected.  
Table A2: Comparison of Afrobarometer and Freedom House measures 
 Crime Law-tax Trust 
Army 
Trust Loc. 
Rep 
Reps. 
Corrupt 
Police 
Corrupt 
FH Political Rights 0.00 0.56 0.21 0.26 0.13 0.17 
FH Civil Liberties -0.06 0.51 -0.07 -0.01 0.11 0.02 
 
  Crime Law-
tax 
Trust 
Army 
Trust 
Local 
Rep 
Reps 
Corrupt 
Police 
Corrupt 
Mo Ibrahim Contracts 0.53 -0.14 -0.44 -0.38 -0.27 -0.22 
Mo Ibrahim Safety -0.57 0.25 0.40 0.48 -0.44 -0.62 
Mo Ibrahim Corruption -0.09 -0.28 -0.17 -0.15 -0.26 -0.45 
Mo Ibrahim Participation -0.17 0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.45 -0.46 
Mo Ibrahim Rule of Law etc. -0.10 -0.20 0.00 -0.05 -0.42 -0.42 
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 Freedom House scores range from one to seven, with one being the best score.  
Thus I expect positive correlations with Crime and the corruption variables and 
negative correlations with Law-tax and the trust variables.  However, the correlations 
in general are low.  The one surprising result is that Law-tax is moderately positively 
correlated with both Freedom House indices, which implies that higher expectations of 
taxes being collected are associated with fewer political rights and civil liberties.   
 The comparison with other measures of governance, while limited to a thirteen 
country sample, does offer some insight.  The corruption variables are the only 
Afrobarometer measures that consistently correlate negatively with the MI indices, 
which suggests that they are perhaps better measures of governance than the trust 
variables.  The correlations with the Crime and Law-tax variables are not as strong as 
expected, and the positive correlation of Law-tax with the Freedom House scores 
indicates that this variable may capture government heavy-handedness.   
The comparison also points out the strengths of the Afrobarometer variables and the 
methods used to create them.  For example, it seems that the MI contracts index is 
problematic – its correlations go the wrong way with most of the Afrobarometer 
variables.  Since it is an index, it is not clear if the problem is with the variable itself or 
is a result of the arbitrary weights used to scale it.  The positive correlations of Law-
tax with the Freedom House scores are surprising as well, but since it is clear what 
Law-tax measures – the percentage of people who expect the law to be enforced if 
they do not pay taxes – it is possible to explain the surprising result.  
 116 
APPENDIX 2: MINIMUM DISTANCE FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 The basic idea of factor analysis is that if one has many variables that are 
indicators of a single underlying unobserved variable, a structure is implied on the 
variance covariance matrix of the indicators.  Suppose that the model is  
 yi = βiu+εi (A1) 
where y is the indicator and u is the unobserved variable.  This model implies a certain 
structure.  For example, if i = 4 and we assume that σεiεj = 0 for all i,j, then the 
variance-covariance matrix V has the following structure:  
β1
2σ2u+σ
2
ε1 β1β2σ
2
u β1β3σ
2
u β1β4σ
2
u 
β2β1σ
2
u β2
2σ2u+σ
2
ε2 β2β3σ
2
u β2β4σ
2
u 
β3β1σ
2
u β3β2σ
2
u β3
2σ2u+σ
2
ε3 β3β4σ
2
u 
β4β1σ
2
u β4β2σ
2
u β4β3σ
2
u β4
2σ2u+σ
2
ε4 
 Under the critical assumption that σεiεj = 0 for all i,j, there are in this case nine 
structural variables and ten unique entries in V, so the system appears to be identified.  
However, σ2u is never observed separately from one of the βs, so we cannot yet 
identify all the parameters.  It is necessary to make some normalization, so we 
normalize β1=1, and then we can identify all of the other parameters in the system.   
 The parameters are then estimated by minimum distance.  We take the 
computed variance covariance matrix and stack the upper right triangle into the vector 
Π.  We then stack the upper right triangle of V as well into the vector v and choose the 
parameter set Θ to minimize the distance between Π and v.  The problem is: 
 min Θ (Π-v)’Ω(Π-v) 
 For efficient minimum distance, the matrix Ω should be the inverse variance of 
Π, that is the inverse variance of the sample variance.  Solving this problem gives 
parameter estimates as well as a test of fit of the model.  The parameter estimates are 
then used to create the factor scores.  If we let G be the estimated matrix from the 
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parameters, b be the vector of factor loadings for each indicator and X be the matrix of 
data, the factors scores are then given by: 
 Scores = X*G
-1*b*σ2u  (A2) 
 In the analysis of this paper, I used the following indicators of wealth to create 
the wealth factor scores: radio, television, refrigerator, car/truck, and dirt floor.  The 
coefficients for each of these indicators were estimated by a model exactly as 
presented above.  The coefficient for the radio indicator was normalized to one and the 
factor scores were then computed from the estimated parameters.  This same technique 
was used to create the public goods factor score and the Law variable.  Table A3 
presents the factor loadings for each of the three factor scores used in the analysis.  
Table A3: Factor Analysis Results 
Public Goods  Loading Law Loading Wealth Factor Loading 
Flush Toilet 1.000 Law-Tax 1.000 Radio 1.000 
Electricity 1.400 Law-Crime 0.122 Television 1.744 
Telephone 0.637 Courts Bind* 0.327 Refrigerator 1.201 
Piped Water 1.338 Trust Courts 0.236 Car/Truck 0.575 
Dirt Floor -0.546 Judges Corrupt -0.248 Dirt Floor -1.068 
σ
2
ε1 0.010 σ
2
ε1 0.000 σ
2
ε1 0.224 
σ
2
ε2 0.029 σ
2
ε2 0.000 σ
2
ε2 0.041 
σ
2
ε3 0.004 σ
2
ε3 0.006 σ
2
ε3 0.054 
σ
2
ε4 0.008 σ
2
ε4 0.010 σ
2
ε4 0.049 
σ
2
ε5 0.221 σ
2
ε5 0.056 σ
2
ε5 0.213 
σ
2
u 0.052 σ
2
u 0.068 σ
2
u 0.043 
Chi2(5) 1979.075 Chi2(5) 16735.901 Chi2(5) 2919.562 
*Courts Bind measures the percentage of people who agree or strongly agree that court rulings should 
bind 
 Note that the loadings in table A1 are not the same as the actual weights used 
to create the factor scores.  The loadings represent the β’s from equation A1, that is 
they represent the effect of wealth (or public goods, or court systems) on the indicator.  
The actual index weights used to create the variables used in the paper are given by:  
 Weights = G
-1*b*σ2u (A3) 
 Table A4 presents the index weights applied to each of the three variables 
created through this method in the paper.  The interesting finding here is that for the 
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Law variable, the weights on the last three variables that go into it are zero.  Thus this 
variable is actually a weighted average of only two factors, Law-tax and Law-crime, 
because the results of the factor model are that the other three indicators of court 
functioning have a weight of zero.   
Table A4: Index Weights for Factor Analysis Variables 
Public Goods 
Variables 
Index 
Weights 
Law 
Variables 
Index 
Weights 
Wealth 
Variables 
Index 
Weights 
Flush Toilet 0.19 Law-Tax 0.50 Radio 0.03 
Electricity 0.09 Law-Crime 4.38 Television 0.27 
Telephone 0.31 Courts Bind 0.00 Refrigerator 0.16 
Piped Water 0.33 Trust Courts 0.00 Car/Truck 0.08 
Dirt Floor 0.00 Judges 
Corrupt 
0.00 Dirt Floor -0.05 
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APPENDIX 3: CONCERNING THE ENDOGENEITY OF REGIONAL LEVEL 
VARIABLES ON HOUSEHOLD WEALTH 
 The concern is often raised that the technique used in this paper of regressing 
household (lower level) wealth on regional (upper level) institutional variables does 
not avoid the problem of endogeneity because the institutional variables are identified 
off of the regional means of the household variables.  If this concern is valid, the 
estimations here are equivalent to regressing regional means of household variables on 
regional institutional variables.  I show that when household controls are included 
regressing household variables on regional institutional variables is different than 
regressing regional means on the regional institutional variables, and further that the 
coefficients on the regional institutional variables are identified off of both household 
and regional level data, not just off of the regional means of the household data.   
Proof:  Let y be the 1 x n dependent variable at the household (lower) level and let X 
be a 2 x n matrix of independent variables where X1 is a household level variable and 
X2 is a regional (upper) level variable.   
We begin with the least squares estimator  
 β = (X’X)-1(X’y) (1) 
Expansion of (1) gives  
 β2 = [X1’X2X2’y-X2’X1X1’y]/det(X’X) (2) 
β2 is the coefficient on the regional variable.  Now consider two cases.  In the first 
case, let y and X1 be the regional means of the household variables.  In the second 
case, let y and X1 remain household variables.  In case one, we have 
 X1’X2X2’y = [X2r1Σr1X1/j+…+X2rmΣrmX1/j]*[X2r1Σr1y/j+…+X2rmΣrmy/j] (3) 
 X2’X1X1’y = [X2r1Σr1X1/j+…+X2rmΣrmX1/j]*[Σr1X1Σr1y/j
2+…+ΣrmX1Σrmy/j
2
] (4) 
Where r stands for region and there m regions, each of which has j households.  In case 
two, we have 
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 X1’X2X2’y = [X2r1Σr1X1+…+X2rmΣrmX1]*[X2r1Σr1y+…+X2rmΣrmy]  (5) 
 X2’X1X1’y = [X2r1Σr1X1+…+X2rmΣrmX1]*[X11y1+X12y2+…+X1nyn] (6) 
It is clear that the first term in β2, X1’X2X2’y, differs across the two cases only by a 
factor of j
2
.  That is (3) is equivalent to (5)/j
2.  However, the second term in β2, 
X2’X1X1’y, is substantively different across the two cases.  The first part, X2’X1, differs 
only by a factor of j, but the second part, X1’y, is truly different.  In case one X1’y 
consists of the regional means of X1 times the regional means of y.  Expanding these 
terms gives an expression that includes each x1i multiplied by yi and by yj for all other j 
in the same region.  In case two, the X1’y term consists of each x1i multiplied only by yi.  
Thus this last term differs substantively across the two cases.  It follows that in general 
β2 is different in the two cases and thus regressing regional variables on household data 
is not equivalent to regressing regional variables on regional means so long as 
household controls are included.  The coefficient on the regional variable is identified 
from both regional and household variation, not just from regional variation and is 
therefore not endogenous (so long as the assumption that households treat institutions as 
exogenous holds).  
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APPENDIX 4: TABLE A5: FULL REGRESSION RESULTS 
Estimation by weighted least squares, dependent variable is wealth factor score 
 
Observations: 118,262  R-squared: 0.5259 
Variable Coefficient Std. Err. t-stat p-value 
Complete Primary Education 0.17 0.02 8.78 0.00 
Incomplete Secondary Education 0.43 0.03 13.80 0.00 
Complete Secondary Education 0.81 0.06 13.97 0.00 
Higher Education 1.25 0.04 29.91 0.00 
Age  0.02 0.00 8.63 0.00 
Age Squared 0.00 0.00 -9.05 0.00 
Female Household Head -0.08 0.02 -4.90 0.00 
Household in Urban Area 0.40 0.03 13.02 0.00 
Law -0.07 0.03 -2.04 0.04 
Trust Army 0.96 0.26 3.73 0.00 
Trust Local Rep -0.90 0.28 -3.19 0.00 
Contact Local Rep 1.76 0.66 2.67 0.01 
Contact Local Rep Squared -0.83 0.33 -2.52 0.01 
Reps Corrupt -0.96 0.47 -2.04 0.04 
Police Corrupt 1.43 0.52 2.73 0.01 
Police Corrupt Squared -1.27 0.47 -2.74 0.01 
Public Goods Factor Score 0.19 0.10 1.89 0.06 
Crime*Law 0.14 0.08 1.64 0.10 
Crime*Trust Army -1.29 0.36 -3.58 0.00 
Crime*Trust Local Rep 1.41 0.35 4.07 0.00 
Crime*Ed Years -0.08 0.02 -3.18 0.00 
Crime*Urban 0.29 0.21 1.36 0.18 
Law*Trust Army 0.11 0.04 2.70 0.01 
Law*Public Goods Factor 0.05 0.02 2.53 0.01 
Trust Army*Ed Years -0.08 0.03 -2.48 0.01 
Trust Local Rep*Police Corrupt -0.95 0.42 -2.30 0.02 
Trust Local Rep*Ed Years 0.12 0.02 4.94 0.00 
Trust Local Rep*Urban -1.44 0.33 -4.38 0.00 
Contact Local Rep*Contact Nat Rep -0.63 0.54 -1.17 0.24 
Contact Local Rep*Urban 0.94 0.33 2.88 0.01 
Contact Nat Rep*Reps Corrupt 1.20 0.62 1.95 0.05 
Contact Nat Rep*Public Goods Factor 0.15 0.10 1.52 0.13 
Reps Corrupt*Urban -1.51 0.45 -3.34 0.00 
Police Corrupt*Urban 1.24 0.36 3.48 0.00 
Public Goods Factor*Urban -0.09 0.03 -3.13 0.00 
Constant -1.58 0.21 -7.48 0.00 
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APPENDIX 5:  OBJECTIVE CRIME MEASURES 
There are two types of objective crime measures available in the survey: crime 
rates and indicators of the presence of security forces.  These forces range from local 
police to the army, with several groups that fall in between.  Please see Fafchamps and 
Moser (2003) for a more detailed discussion of crime in Madagascar.   
We have crime rate data for the estimated numbers of murders per capita, 
break-ins per capita, and cattle thefts per capita.  For security presence, we measure 
whether police, army, gendarmes, or quartiers mobile are present in a commune.  
Table A presents the results of three regressions using these variables.  The first is a 
simple OLS regression on Employment with all of the infrastructure and institution 
variables that uses the crime rates rather than subjective security.  The second is the 
same as the first but adds in all of the indicators of security presence.  The only 
objective security variable that has a significant effect in either of these initial 
regressions is the Gendarmes indicator, so in the third regression we instrument for it 
and run a regression that is otherwise similar to the final specification in the paper.  
We find that Gendarmes has no significant effect there.   
Table A6: Effects of Objective Crime Variables 
Specification OLS on 
Employment 
OLS on 
Employment 
IV Tobit on 
Employment 
Variables    
Murders per capita 75.28 (1549.5) -343.37 (1633.83)  
Break - ins per captia 92.64 (399.3) 91.40 (398.25)  
Cattle thefts per capita -7.96 (12.6) -12.90 (12.56)  
Gendarmes present  2.37* (1.22) 10.87 (13.28) 
Quartiers Mobile present  -0.03 (1.90)  
Police present  1.83 (1.36)  
Military present  3.79 (2.53)  
Other variables All other 
infrastructure and 
institution variables 
All other 
infrastructure and 
institution variables 
Institution and 
geography 
variables 
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APPENDIX 6: VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION 
 Consider a variable x with a variance V(x).  The variable has 4 levels and we 
want to decompose the variance into the variance at each level.  Denote by c the 
lowest level, d the next lowest, r the second highest and p the highest level.  We need 
to define the variance at each level.  The total variance is  
V(x) = E(xi - u)
2
  (A1) 
where i is the ith observation and u is the mean.  For the variance at the lowest 
level, c, we then define 
V(c) = E(xi – ud)
2 
(A2)
 
 where ud is the mean of level d.  Thus V(c) is the variance within the level m 
groupings and between the level s groupings.  We similarly define the variance at 
levels d and r as  
V(d) = E(ud – ur)
2
   (A3) 
V(r) = E(ur – up)
2 
(A4)
 
We are then left with the variance at the highest level, which by definition is  
V(p) = V(x) – V(s) – V(m) – V(r) (A5) 
The variance decomposition presented in Table 2 was calculated from 
equations A2 through A5 where communes are the lowest level (c), districts are the 
second lowest (d), regions the second highest (r) and provinces the highest level (p).   
 124 
APPENDIX 7: WITHIN AND BETWEEN ESTIMATIONS 
Table A7: Within and Between Estimations 
Dependent Variable: 
Employment 
Between 
Estimation 
Within 
Estimation 
Between 
Estimation 2 
Within 
Estimation 2 
Institutional Variables     
 Titled  43.99** (19.32) 36.64* (19.94) 34.44*** (6.82) 39.36*** (6.80) 
 Titled Squared -15.14 (28.80) 4.18 (29.22)   
 Security -2.32 (1.52) 2.03 (1.61)   
Physical Infrastructure     
 Paved Road 8.07*** (1.83) 8.80*** (1.75) 8.07*** (1.80) 8.86*** (1.73) 
 Unpaved Road 1.54 (1.50) -2.71* (1.47) 1.59 (1.51) -2.15 (1.47) 
 National Electricity 15.67*** (3.51) 9.57** (3.79) 15.94*** (3.51) 9.84*** (3.77) 
 Landline Phone Service 12.04*** (2.94) 13.56*** (2.56) 11.73*** (2.92) 13.95*** (2.55) 
 Cell Phone Service 3.04 (2.23) 3.10 (1.97) 2.48 (2.20) 2.88 (1.96) 
 Community Wells 5.46*** (1.88) 3.63** (1.84) 5.16*** (1.87) 3.20* (1.85) 
 Public Running Water 13.41*** (3.32) 15.15*** (3.33) 13.64*** (3.32) 15.28*** (3.33) 
 Number of Serv. Stations 4.32** (1.80) 8.50*** (2.00) 5.59*** (1.97) 8.18*** (2.04) 
 Number of Serv. Stations
2
 -0.18** (0.08) -0.32*** (0.09) -0.22*** (0.08) -0.31*** (0.09) 
Market Infrastructure     
 Number of Daily Markets 4.56*** (1.01) 1.34 (1.04) 4.33*** (1.02) 1.19 (1.13) 
 Number of Daily Markets
2
 -0.16*** (0.04) -0.03 (0.04) -0.15*** (0.04) -0.02 (0.05) 
 Number of Seasonal Mar. -0.73 (0.47) -0.42 (0.66) -0.28 (0.18) 0.43 (0.28) 
 Number of Seasonal Mar.
2
 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)   
 Formal Credit in Agriculture -1.06 (1.33) 0.03 (4.93)   
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APPENDIX 8:  FIRST STAGE RESULTS 
 Table A8 below presents the first stage results for our main three endogenous 
variables: Titled, Security and Formal Credit in Agriculture.  An OLS estimator was 
used on Titled, treating it as a continuous variable.  An ordered probit would be more 
appropriate, but with only three instruments we could not identify each level of the 
ordered probit.  Probits were used in the first stage estimates for Security and Formal 
Credit in Agriculture.  The predicted value for each of these variables is then the 
probability that the variable equals one based on the probit coefficients.   
Table A8: First Stage Results 
First Stage Regressions Titled Security Agricultural Credit 
Estimator OLS Probit Probit 
Observations 2746 2714 2738 
R
2
 (OLS) / Pseudo R
2 
(Probit) 0.107 0.073 0.073 
French Presence 1.14* (0.63) 0.08 (0.07) -0.09 (0.07) 
French Administration 1.37** (0.65) -0.12* (0.64) -0.00 (0.07) 
Foreigners Present 0.61 (0.54) 0.01 (0.06) 0.14** (0.06) 
Ocean 0.58 (0.83) 0.17** (0.09) 0.06 (0.08) 
River -0.85 (0.50) 0.09* (0.05) -0.32*** (0.06) 
Forest 0.10 (0.72) -0.02 (0.07) 0.38*** (0.08) 
Distance to Urban Center -0.79*** (0.22) -4.43* (2.66) -21.22*** (1.90) 
Population 1.15*** (0.31) 2.86 (2.09) 2.70 (1.97) 
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APPENDIX 9: STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS AND OTHER SIMULTANEOUS 
EQUATIONS ESTIMATES 
 Each structural equation takes the following form: 
 yit = βxit + γzit + ci + tt + εit (A6) 
where xit is a vector of endogenous variables zit a vector of exogenous 
variables and ci and tt country and time fixed effects.  The simultaneous equations 
model has ten endogenous and ten exogenous variables.  Table A9 denotes which 
variables are in each remaining structural equation.  The variables absent each 
structural equation form the exclusion restrictions that identify the model.  Note that 
the purpose of this model is to fully specify the equations for Growth, Death Rate and 
Civil Violence, therefore the equations for the other endogenous variables have fewer 
endogenous variables and should not necessarily be considered fully specified.  
Table A9: Structural Equations 
 Savings Trade Aidpc GDPpc Ex.Const. Polity Part. 
Death Rate Yes No No No No No No 
Civil Violence Yes No No No No No No 
Savings - No No No No No No 
Trade No - No Yes No No No 
Aid per capita Yes No - No No No No 
GDP per capita Yes No No - Yes No No 
Ex. Constraints Yes No No Yes - No No 
Polity No Yes Yes No No - No 
Participation No No No No No No - 
Change in Temp No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Change in Prec. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pop. Density Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years Ind.  No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Civ. Viol Spatial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Death Rate Spat. No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Savings Spatial No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Trade Spatial Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
GDPpc Spatial No No Yes Yes No No Yes 
Polity Spatial No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
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 Tables A10 through A16 present the simultaneous equations results for the 
remaining endogenous variables.  
     Table A10: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on Savings 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Death Rate -1.1205 1.839 0.542 
Executive Constraints 5.0428 4.780 0.291 
Aid per capita 0.1838 0.938 0.845 
Civil Violence 2.1513 1.074 0.045 
GDP per capita -0.0296 0.040 0.456 
Savings spatial lag -75.8970 5.705 0.000 
     Table A11: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on Trade 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Polity -2.5831 0.041 0.000 
Trade Spatial Lag -10.7643 5.360 0.045 
Civil Violence Spatial Lag -287.4631 1.463 0.000 
Savings Spatial Lag -25.6971 1.440 0.000 
Deathrate Spatial Lag 81.2112 1.716 0.000 
Years Independent -3.0540 0.086 0.000 
Population Density -8.5487 0.020 0.000 
Change in Precipitation -7.1077 0.595 0.000 
Change in Temperature 0.5229 26.752 0.984 
     Table A12: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on Aid per capita 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Polity -2.1257 0.047 0.000 
Years Independent -2.6351 1.908 0.167 
GDP per capita spatial lag -2.0793 2.340 0.374 
Trade spatial lag 45.1555 6.127 0.000 
Savings spatial lag -27.5669 1.643 0.000 
Death Rate spatial lag -35.8463 1.963 0.000 
Civil Violence spatial lag -13.9623 1.668 0.000 
Population Density 11.6949 0.099 0.000 
Change in Precipitation -0.5686 3.066 0.853 
Change in Temperature -0.5819 18.070 0.974 
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Table A13: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on GDP per capita 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Executive Constraints 112.33 2.73 0.000 
Trade 0.37 0.11 0.001 
GDP per capita spatial lag 4673.58 0.07 0.000 
Savings spatial lag 826.47 5.56 0.000 
Death Rate spatial lag 888.47 18.88 0.000 
Civil Violence spatial lag -2200.65 8.56 0.000 
Years Independent 10471.19 0.02 0.000 
Population Density 19219.83 0.01 0.000 
Change in Precipitation 26.08 0.01 0.000 
Change in Temperature 97.28 0.39 0.000 
Table A14: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on Executive Constraints 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Polity Spatial Lag -3.4674 0.186 0.000 
GDP per capita 0.0002 0.001 0.678 
Savings spatial lag -3.8372 0.192 0.000 
Death Rate spatial lag 3.8846 0.702 0.000 
Civil Violence spatial lag -8.3760 1.710 0.000 
Years Independent -0.4452 7.720 0.954 
Population Density -0.4544 2.127 0.831 
Change in Precipitation -1.0064 9.968 0.920 
Change in Temperature 0.0146 1.722 0.993 
Table A15: Simultaneous Equations Results on Polity 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Polity Spatial Lag -23.69 0.19 0.000 
Trade spatial lag 5.87 0.89 0.000 
Savings spatial lag -13.37 0.20 0.000 
Death Rate spatial lag 3.51 0.32 0.000 
Civil Violence spatial lag -31.97 0.07 0.000 
Population Density -1.99 2.76 0.472 
Change in Precipitation -3.62 13.38 0.787 
Change in Temperature 0.14 5.43 0.979 
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Table A16: Simultaneous Equations Estimates on Participation 
 Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
Polity Spatial Lag -11.09 0.14 0.000 
Population Density -13.97 0.43 0.000 
GDP per capita spatial lag -3.16 7.59 0.677 
Trade spatial lag 3.89 0.92 0.000 
Savings spatial lag -3.80 0.19 0.000 
Death Rate spatial lag 5.29 0.29 0.000 
Civil Violence spatial lag -18.41 0.05 0.000 
Years Independent -7.37 4.90 0.132 
Change in Precipitation -1.80 13.48 0.894 
Change in Temperature -0.02 3.53 0.996 
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APPENDIX 10: SPATIAL AND SERIAL AUTOCORRELATION 
 The residuals in a panel estimation on country data may be subject to both 
spatial and serial autocorrelation.  Denote the reduced form residual by µit.  If spatial 
autocorrelation is present, the residual has the following form:  
 µit = λWµits + εit (A7) 
 where W is the spatial weight matrix, µits is the vector of residuals of other 
countries in the sample and λ is the spatial autocorrelation correction.  The spatial 
weights in W are the inverse distances of each other country from the center of 
country i.  The residual may also be subject to serial autocorrelation, in which case it 
takes the form: 
  µit =  ρµit-1 + εit (A8) 
 where ρ is the serial autocorrelation correction.    To see if spatial 
autocorrelation was present I calculated the pairwise correlations of each reduced form 
residual and its spatial lag.  If spatial autocorrelation is present then the correlation 
should be non-zero, otherwise it should be zero.  I found correlations significantly 
different from zero in the residuals for Civil Violence, Savings, GDP per capita, 
Executive Constraints and Participation.  I then estimated λ for each of those residuals 
via minimum distance and corrected them.  Table A17 presents the correlations and 
significance of the uncorrected and corrected residuals with their spatial lags.  
 I examined the residuals for serial autocorrelation by initially computing the 
pairwise correlations of the residuals and their temporal lags.  I further calculated three 
statistical tests for serial autocorrelation in panel data.  The first is from Wooldridge 
(2002).  It tests whether the regression coefficient on a regression of the residuals from 
the first difference regression on their temporal lag is equal to -.5, which it should 
equal if no serial autocorrelation is present.  Table A18 presents the p-value from this 
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test; a value less than 0.05 indicates a rejection of the null of no autocorrelation.  The 
second and third tests are adjustments of the Durbin-Watson test for panel data due to 
Bhargava et al. (1982) and Baltagi and Wu (1999).  The Bhargava test indicates serial 
autocorrelation if the statistic is less than 1.81 and no serial autocorrelation if the 
statistic is greater than 1.90.  The Baltagi and Wu (1999) test does not have a widely 
accepted range of critical values; I consider it to indicate autocorrelation if the statistic 
is less than two.  These tests indicate that serial autocorrelation is present in most of 
the residuals.  I thus calculated ρ via minimum distance and corrected the residuals for 
every endogenous variable except Growth.   
Table A17: Correlations of Residuals with Residual Spatial Lags 
 Civil Viol.  Savings GDPpc Ex. Const. Participation 
Reduced Form Corr. 0.11 0.18 -0.15 -0.08 -0.08 
     (p-value) 0.02 0.00  0.00  0.10  0.10 
Corrected Correlation 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
     (p-value) 1.00 1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Table A18: Tests for Serial Autocorrelation 
     Base 
correlation 
Wooldridge Bhargava et al. Baltagi-Wu LBI 
Growth -0.04 0.01 1.71 2.07 
Death Rate 0.65 0.00 0.54 0.86 
Civil Violence 0.60 0.00 0.67 0.91 
Savings 0.35 0.00 1.16 1.35 
Trade 0.54 0.00 0.71 1.04 
Aid per capita 0.46 0.00 0.87 1.16 
GDP per capita 0.37 0.00 0.94 1.30 
Executive Constraints 0.41 0.00 0.89 1.30 
Polity 0.48 0.00 0.78 1.17 
Participation 0.41 0.00 0.93 1.28 
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